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Abstract
In this study I provide an empirical analysis of the judicial system. The main emphasis of this study is
on the causes and consequences of judicial independence.
In the first chapter, I analyze the determinants of judicial independence in a cross-country setting. I
investigate the empirical evidence for two hypotheses about the conditions for judicial independence: insti-
tutional protection and political competition. Using a new set of indicators from constitutions of countries,
I show that there is no evidence for a significant effect of institutional rules on judicial independence. A
panel data analysis shows a significant effect of political competition on judicial independence. This effect
holds after including country-specific fixed effects, using instrumental variables to address the issue of reverse
causality, and controlling for persistence in judicial independence and mean-reverting dynamics.
The second chapter examines the relative merits of judicial selection methods in the American states.
The conventional wisdom holds that appointive judges act differently from elected judges, because they
are more independent and are less vulnerable to public pressure. Existing theories suggest that appointive
systems create more uncertainty; therefore, one should expect higher litigation rates in these systems. Those
theories also suggest that public pressure forces elected judges to be more productive. Using time-series
data on litigation rates and opinions, I investigate the impact of switching in selection methods on judicial
behavior. I use tests of structural break, with both known and unknown dates, to examine whether a switch
from elective and appointive systems to a merit selection causes a structural regime change. I evaluate the
results using asymptotic results in the literature as well as with Monte Carlo analysis. My results contradict
the existing theories. A change in selection method causes a regime change, but the direction of the change is
not consistent with the predictions of the theory. For example, the litigation rates in Connecticut increased
after switching to merit plan, whereas the litigation rates in New Mexico dropped. Moreover, I find that
adopting a merit plan significantly reduces the number of opinions written by the Supreme Court justices,
though some exceptions exist. All together, I conclude that the switch in the selection method affects the
behavior of both judges and litigants. The effects on the behavior of the judges are stronger than the impact
on the behavior of potential litigants.
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The third chapter studies the behavior of publicly financed defenders in federal criminal cases. Pub-
lic defender organizations represent the majority of state and federal criminal defendants. The empirical
literature on the relative virtues of publicly financed lawyers and private lawyers is inconclusive. In this
paper, I use data on federal criminal cases to examine the performance of publicly financed defenders. I find
that publicly financed defenders, on average, spend less time on their cases and achieve worse outcomes for
their clients, relative to private lawyers. But these results vanish when I examine each group of frequent
offenses separately. Public defenders achieve better outcomes in terms of time and sentence length in simple
cases. In complicated cases, public defenders lose their advantages, and their clients receive higher sentence
time. Unlike the existing literature, I find that neither the public defender, nor the private lawyer has an
absolute advantage. Several factors, including complication of cases, type of defendants, and workload of
defenders, determine the results. These factors affect the results via their effect on the extent of asymmetric
information between defenders, defenders, and prosecutors.
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Chapter 1
Determinants of Judicial
Independence
1.1 Introduction
From the fast-growing literature in the new institutional economics we know that for markets to function
well, a basic framework of a well-functioning law and legal system is necessary. Several national and inter-
national organizations have acknowledged that an efficient - fast, low cost, and impartial - judiciary is the
cornerstone of a prosperous society (World Bank, 1998, 2002, and American Bar Association, 1997). The
general idea, as Barro points out, is “to gauge the attractiveness of a country’s investment climate by con-
sidering the effectiveness of law enforcement, the sanctity of contracts, and the state of the other influences
on the security of property rights” (Barro, 1998). Empirical studies undertaken by the World Bank show a
strong correlation between rule of law and such development indicators as gross national income and infant
mortality rate, nevertheless the causal relation has been a matter of long debates (World Bank, 2002.)
A well-functioning law and legal system contains a long list of common characteristics.1. However, only
some of them have attracted the attention of scholars and researchers, most notably among them is judicial
independence. For instance North and Weingast (1989) introduced judicial independence as a central factor
in economic development of eighteenth century England. Judicial independence was also considered a factor
that improves democracy (Howard and Carey, 2004.)
Attention to the constructive effects of judicial independence is not limited to academia. Political
systems have taken judicial independence more seriously today than anytime in history. Today 72% of
countries have an explicit declaration of judicial independnec in their constitution whereas in 1950, this
percentage was only about 58%. 2
1As Posner proposes: “In its ideal form (an important qualification), the machinery consists of competent, ethical and
well-paid professional judges who administer rules that are well designed for the promotion of commercial activity. The judges
are insulated from interference by the legislative and executive branches of government. They are advised by competent, ethical
and well-paid lawyers. Their decrees are dependably enforced by sheriffs, bailiffs, police or other functionaries (again competent,
ethical and well-paid) The judges are numerous enough to decide cases without interminable delay, and they operate against a
background of rules and practices, such as accounting standards, bureaus of vital statistics, and public registries of land titles
and security interests, that enable them to resolve factual issues relating to legal disputes with reasonable accuracy and at
reasonable cost to the disputants”. (Posner, 1998, p. 1-2)
2Calculated by author from The Comparative Constitutions Project, Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, 2007.
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Although the question of the impact of judicial independence has been addressed by many scholars,
the question of the determinants of judicial independence is still a subject of debates. Moreover, the main
body of literature in this area is devoted to theoretical works. Empirical investigation of the determinants
of judicial independence is surprisingly rare. This paper is an empirical investigation of the determinants of
judicial independence. Introducing a new set of constitutional characteristics, using panel data analysis on
judicial independence, and investigating two types of determinants of judicial independence are unique to
this current paper.
Existing literature points to two main factors that potentially affect the independence of the judiciary:
institutional protection and political structure. Institutional protections refer to arrangements designed to
enable judges to operate free from extralegal interventions. Life tenure, control over salary and budget, and
selection methods that are less susceptible to interventions by politicians are the most common arrange-
ments. This line of literature argues that once a judge is protected, by constitution or ordinary legal rules,
against political or economic powers, independence of a judiciary is achievable. Literature on the political
competition theory, on the other hand, points to some elements in political structure as major determinants
of judicial independence. The proponents of this approach argue that if politicians in executive and/or leg-
islative branches face the threat of losing their power, they support an independent judiciary just to ensure
their long-run benefits. This line of literature, therefore, presents political competition as the main factor
in shaping the independence of judiciary. There is no study that uses time series and cross section data to
investigate the effect of both types of factors on judicial independence.
I start with clarifying a conceptual problem in the literature. Most studies use two terms: judicial
independence and institutional protection for judicial independence, interchangeably. For instance Hanssen
(2004) uses selection methods as proxies for the independence of judiciary in the stats of the United States.
Also Klerman and Mahoney (2004) consider “greater security of tenure, higher salaries, and greater en-
forcement power” as improvement in independence. The underlying assumption is that these protections
automatically result in independence of judges. There is an explicit distinction between these two concepts.
Judicial independence refers to the question of whether judges are free from illegal influence of political
or economic powers, whereas institutional protection points to the arrangements made to facilitate the
independence of judges. The effect of the latter on the former is the subject of investigation in this paper.
The first result is that institutional protection does not have any significant effect on judicial indepen-
dence. Figures 1 and 2 show this diagrammatically by plotting a measure of judicial independence against
two different measures of institutional protection, constitutional protection indicator (introduced in section
4 of this paper) and a de jure judicial independence indicator of Feld and Voigt (2003). Both graphs show
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that there is a very slight, if any, relationship between institutional protection and judicial independence.
Moreover, the constitutional indicator even seems to have a negative effect, in contrast with all theories in
this area. The results of basic regression analysis in table 2 present the details of this relationship. None
of the two indicators of institutional protection shows a significant relationship, positive or negative, with
judicial independence.
This basic finding is robust to using different indicators of judicial independence, to using components of
institutional protection, to different econometric specification and estimation techniques, and to the inclusion
of additional covariates. Specifically, none of the components of institutional protection indicator, including
indices of life tenure, selection methods, control over salary and budget, extra powers for the judiciary, and
even an explicit declaration of judicial independence in the constitution. Even some of these components, the
indicator of the declaration of independence in the constitution in particular, are negatively associated with
judicial independence. Table 5 shows that many countries with a low performance in judicial independence
have an explicit declaration of independence in their constitutions, and several countries with a good record
in protecting civil and political rights do not have such a declaration.
Pooled OLS results for a 5-year panel as well as fixed effect results that investigates “within country”
variations, do not change the basic findings.
To control for the effect of implementation of rules, I use, in table 6, an indicator of the de facto insti-
tutional protection (Feld and Voigt, 2003). This variable, which is by definition the institutional protection
in reality, has a positive correlation with judicial independence in the absence of any control variable. But
once controlled for per capita income, this correlation disappears.
These results therefore shed considerable doubt on theories that seek the determinants of judicial
independence in institutional arrangements. Not only does the causal effect of institutional protection on
judicial independence not hold, but available data also do not support any significant positive correlation
between the two indicators.
The second part of the results show that there is a positive association between judicial independence
and political competition. Figures 3 and 4 show this positive association for two measures of political
competition: POLITY2 index (Marshal and Jaggers, 2005) and Freedom House index of political rights. Both
these indicators are composite indices that measure different aspects of political competition including the
existence and quality of the electoral process for both legislative and executive branches, political pluralism
and participation, and the existence of oppositions and alternative political options for citizens, among some
other factors.
The positive association of political competition and judicial independence is shown in pooled OLS
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results for a five-year panel between 1970 and 2005 (Table 8 and 9). The association is strong and highly
significant in a simple regression (Model 1). Controlling for income and durability of political systems
decreases the magnitude but does not remove its significance (Model 2).
Pooled OLS suggests a positive association between judicial independence and political competition.
The results are biased due to two main issues. First, the main source of potential bias is country-specific
factors that affect both judicial independence and political competition. The historical path of development
of a society is unique and is the main potential factor affecting the judicial as well as the political structure.
In the absence of control for country-specific factors, the regression results suffer from omitted variable
biases. If these omitted features are time invariant, the inclusion of fixed effects will remove them. The
fixed effect model investigates “within-country” variations. It asks the question of what happens to judicial
independence in a specific country if that country becomes relatively democratic?
The results of the fixed effect estimators confirm the results of pooled OLS, but with less magnitude
and significance for coefficient of political competition. Controlling for country effects enables the model to
explain about 70% of variations in the judicial independence score. The coefficint of judicial independece is
still significant although only in the 5% level.
The second issue is the endogeneity of explanatory variables. The fixed effect estimator removes the
effects of country-specific characteristics, but does not address the issue of “reverse causality.” Not only does
political competition affect judicial independence, but at the same time judicial independence has an impact
on political competition. A well-known strategy to resolve this issue is to use instrumental variables. In
panel data analysis, finding instruments are easier than cross sectional analysis: lagged values of explanatory
variables are less likely to be correlated with the dependent variable, therefore, they are natural candidates
for instruments. I use two (five-year) lagged values of political competition as instruments. Model 1 and 2
in table 10 show the results of fixed effect instrumental variable estimators. The results confirm the positive
impact of political competition on judicial independence. The coefficient is about 0.08, which means a 10%
increase in the political competition score induces 0.8% increase in the judicial independence score. The
magnitude of the effect is not high, but it is positive and significant.
In any of the above estimations, inclusion of a lagged value of judicial independence increases the
explanatory power of the whole model, but decreases the magnitude and significance of the political compe-
tition index. In fixed effect models the coefficient of the political competition is no longer significant even
at the 10% level. In a fixed effect instrumental variable model, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level.
In all these models the lagged judicial independence has the most significant effect, which shows a strong
tendency to persistance. Judicial independence is a stable indicator. Even in long-period panel (five-year
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data), the effect of its past values is dominant. The long run effect of political competiton in a dynamic
model can be calculated. For the instrumental variable fixed effect model, the long run effect is about
0.091/(1− 0.205) = 0.115.
The importance of the dynamic effect and the historical country-specific effect suggest a new theory
in explaining the independence of the judiciary. Judicial independence is an “institution” that develops
and strengthens in the long run. Although some short-term factors might help to enhance it, the main
parameter is the historical trend of economic and political improvements of societies. The Arrelano-Bond
GMM estimator that corrects biases due to estimating a dynamic model, points to long-term factors as the
crucial feature of judicial independence. These features are other “institutions” that have been developed
during decades, maybe centuries, and determine the overall “development paths” of countries. Acemoglu et.
al. (2006) propose that the improvement in income and democracy in different countries is more likely the
result of “societies embarking on divergent development paths at certain critical junctures during the past
500 years.” I argue that these different “paths” not only determine the economic and political development
of societies, but also set the ground for performance of other organizations, such as the judicial system.
Politicians who intend to improve the performance of the judiciary can play a positive role, but it takes
time and needs improvements in many other features of societies. Nevertheless, in this process, rules that
are designed to improve the independence of the judiciary are not as important as the rulers that hold the
actual power.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 clarifies a conceptual puzzlement in the definition of judicial
independence and introduces the theories on determinants of judicial independence. The data on political
competition, judicial independence and institutional protection are presented in section 3. The Appendix
completes this section by providing detailed information on creating the new variable of constitutional
protection for judicial independence. Section 4 presents the econometric models. The results and their
interpretations are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Determinants of Judicial Independence
There is widespread disagreement on the definition of judicial independence.3 To avoid this conceptual
debate I use the definition provided by the American Bar Association and the World Bank. They separate
judicial independence into two levels: decisional and institutional.4 Decisional independence refers to the
3For a good survey of the debates look at the papers in: Burbank and Friedman (2002) eds. Judicial Independence at the
Crossroads, and Interdisciplinary Approach, 2002.
4These two levels are also called individual and institutional levels (O’Connor 2003), or judge and judiciary levels (Ferejohn,
1999).
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impartiality of judicial decisions. Judiciary, in this sense, refers to the results of a court. The decisions
made in a court should be free from extralegal interventions. If the results are affected by political, social,
or economic positions of parties involved, the decisional independence of the court is violated. Institutional
independence, on the other hand, refers to the relationship between the judiciary and political branches.
Judiciary is one of multiple branches of the state. There are unavoidable relations between these branches.
Independence, in this sense, refers to specific arrangements that prevent the political forces from becoming
the main determinants of judicial behavior.
In this paper I use the first concept, the decisional independence, as judicial independence and the
second one as institutional protection for judicial independence. This choice is consistent with instrumental
approach toward judiciary. Based on this theory, institutional protection (referred to as institutional judicial
independence) is not an end, but an instrument to an end (or ends)(Burbank and Friedman 2002). Insti-
tutional judicial independence, therefore, is valuable only if it improves decisional judicial independence.
In other words, similar to any policy, institutional arrangements do not automatically result in desirable
outcomes. Instead, their effectiveness is a matter of theoretical and empirical investigation.
Decisional judicial independence is close to the concept of judicial performance. The clarifying dis-
tinction is that judicial independence is a subset of performance. A well-functioning judiciary has several
aspects. Independence of judges is only one aspect of it. Most organizations that measure judicial perfor-
mance use the judicial independence as an ingredient. The cornerstone of decisional judicial independence
is the ability of judges to rule based on the law, not based on the political forces.
The first part of this paper investigates the effect of institutional protection on judicial independence.
The second part studies the rival approach toward determinants of judicial independence: “political inter-
action.” Institutional protection approach emphasizes the roles of certain institutional rules on maintaining
judicial independence, whereas the political interaction approach seeks the origin of judicial independence
in the political environment where the judiciary operates. In what follows, I present certain institutional
protections as well as some aspects of the political structure that might affect judicial independence.
1.2.1 The Effect of Institutional Protection
The impact of the institutional rules on judicial independence depends, in the first instance, on the stability
of the rule. The constitution is more stable than any ordinary law. Therefore, if the institutional protection
for independence of the judges is anchored in the constitution, we expect a higher level of independence. It is
also true for a detailed provision of protection in the constitution. A constitution that provides the detailed
rules regarding the power of the judiciary is more capable in protecting the judicial independence. A historical
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example of institutional protection for independence is the Compensation Clause and the Behavior Clause in
the United States Constitution.5 These constitutional arrangements were designed to protect federal judges
from reprisal by politicians and have been effective in providing an stable protection (Ferejohn, 1999).
Among several arrangements in a constitution that are designed to protect judicial independence, the
selection method is the first candidate in the existing literature. Different parts of the state might be
involved in the selection of judges, and the process varies depending on the levels of the judiciary. For
instance, in the United States the Supreme Court justices are selected through nomination by the president
and approval of the Senate. State judges are selected through different methods: from appointment by the
governor, appointment by legislatures, direct election -partisan and nonpartisan- and merit plan. In many
countries, officials in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, or a combination of these bodies, are
involved in the nomination and confirmation of judges. Some countries use a judicial council/commission,
an autonomous body made up of politicians and/or judicial officials, for managing the selection process.
The main concern is the impact of each method on the independence of judges. Political control over
judicial terrain depends on the coordination capacity of those who are involved in the selection process.
Engagement of more parties makes this coordination harder to achieve. Therefore, the general rule is that
the more parties are involved in the selection, the more independent judges are. In the context of the United
States federal courts, the involvement of two parties, president and the Senate, enhances the independence.
In the states, the merit plan provides the most independent judges compared with other selection methods.
The presence of representatives from several political branches as well as civil society makes the judges less
prone to intervention by politicians (Hanssen, 2004). Partisan-elected judges are more likely to decide cases
in favor of their parties; therefore, they are more easily subjected to political pressures. A non-partisan
selection method makes the candidates more willing to make populist decisions. Also, the judges who
stand for election or run for re-election are captured by political groups that rise money for their campaign.
(Berkowitz, Bonneau and Clay, 2005). In recent years there has been an increasing trend toward granting the
power of selecting judges to judicial commissions/councils. They are designed to enhance the independence
of the judiciary and at the same time keep them accountable to democratic values. These bodies have been
considered, at least theoretically, as independence-enhancing organizations. However, the empirical evidence
does not support that theory (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2007).
The methods of removal, re-selection, or discipline of judges have the same effects as selection methods.
The more easily a judge can be removed or replaced, the more vulnerable the judge is to political pressures;
5Compensation clause: “The judges of the supreme Court and inferior Courts shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office” and behavior clause: “The judges, both of
the supreme Court and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior” (Article III Section 1).
7
thus, the less independent she is. Politicians remove trouble-making judges very often. The case of Pakistani
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a recent example in a developing country.6 Even in a well-functioning
judicial system such as the one in the United States, politicians use their power to affect judicial decisions
by removing judicial officials for political reasons. The case of eight federal prosecutors of the United
States, although not a case involving judges, is a recent example.7 Politicians in Japan use replacement and
reassignment as a method to punish judges who act independently. Judges who joined leftist organizations
in the past, and those who have decided cases against the dominant party, receive less attractive jobs and/or
are sent to remote places (Ramseyer and Rasmusen, 1997).
Re-selection and removal methods should be studied along with the tenure of judges. Judges who
have life tenure are less susceptible to direct political intervention. Lengthy tenure reduces the likelihood
of replacement of judges, and, therefore, enhances the independence. In the context of the United States,
federal judges are more independent than state judges because of the life tenure they have (Landes and
Posner 1975). Lengthy tenure has a similar effect. Judges who hold office longer than politicians are more
capable of resisting extralegal interventions (Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart, 2003).
Control over budget and salary, the origin of legal system, the process of adopting a judicial system (or
transplant effect), specific powers delegated to judges (such as judicial review) are among other institutional
arrangements that affect judicial independence.8
1.2.2 The Effect of Political Competition
Many scholars argue that although institutional protections affect the independence of judges, the real
independence can not be achieved unless there is a real intention among politicians to grant and protect
that independence. As Ferejohn put it correctly, “the basic reason constitutional protections for judges
have remained strong and stable over the years is that the political branches, or, perhaps, the people
themselves, have not really wanted to alter them -at least not badly enough (or for long enough) to incur
the substantial costs and political risks associated with such and effort” (Ferejohn, 1999, p. 357). In other
words, if politicians see low risk in intervention on judicial affairs, they will not hesitate to intervene. Judicial
independence is sustainable only when the political system is competitive, and competitors are concerned
with long run payoffs (Stephenson, 2003).
The main source of political risk for a politician is the competition over political power. The more
competitive the political environment is, the more independent the judiciary will be. Politicians delegate
6See a brief summary of this case in: “Demonstrating Lawyers Beaten by Pakistani Police,” in the New York Times, March
13, 2007 Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
7See articles in the New York Times in March 2007 available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
8To see a summary of literature on institutional arrangements for judicial independence see Tiede, 2006.
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part of their power to a judiciary for different reasons. Voigt and Salzberger (2002) present a long list of
these reasons. The list includes, but is not limited to, increasing popularity (by shifting responsibilities, or
avoiding decisions by uncertain results), enhancing information, protecting policies against reversal, improv-
ing credible commitments, and even reducing the workload. All these reasonings are valid only if politicians
face a threat from potential rivals.
Some examples clarify the mechanisms through which competition among politicians makes an indepen-
dent judiciary more profitable for politicians. Landes and Posner (1975) show that an independent judiciary
helps legislatures extract more rent from interest groups. Legislatures empower an independent judiciary
to guarantee that the laws and policies passed today will stay valid after they leave office. The stability of
law enables them to extract more rent. If legislatures know that they will not lose the office in an election,
they do not need an independent judiciary to guarantee the persistence of law. They can do it themselves.
In other words, the potential turnover of political power determines whether politicians are interested in
supporting the independence of a judiciary.
A second example investigates the effect of political competition on judicial independence in the contest
of the states of the United States. Hanssen (2004) shows that more independence-enhancing judiciaries in the
states are associated with more competition between political parties, while the least independence-enhancing
institutions appear in the states with a strong single-party control. By establishing an independent court,
Hanssen argues, politicians make it more difficult for successors to alter the policies. But they have to
take the risk of losing control on policies. Politicians who face this trade off decide whether they can
benefit more by empowering the judiciary. A lower probability of re-election, which is available under
highly competitive political environment, makes it more profitable for incumbent politicians to establish an
independent judiciary.
The last example is a comparison between imperial and contemporary Japan and the United States.
Ramseyer (1994) explicitly denies the judicial independence to be primarily a matter of constitutional text.
The constitutions of both the United States and modern Japan, he argues, purport to insulate judges from
political interventions. Yet Japanese politicians intervene regularly in judicial decision making to ensure that
their judges stay loyal to them. Ramseyer makes a connection between independence of judges on one side,
and the continued electoral system and likelihood of re-election on the other side. Imperial Japan lacked any
continued election; therefore, politicians did not need to support judicial independence. In modern Japan,
the politicians in the dominant party expect competitive elections to continue indefinitely, but they tend
to violate independence of judges because they evaluate the likelihood of their electoral succession to be
high. In contrast with these two cases, politicians in the United States expect uncertain results for elections,
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therefore, they avoid intervention in judicial affairs. In other words whether the politicians keep the judges
independent, is determined by two factors: whether they expect the electoral system to continue indefinitely
and whether they expect to win elections indefinitely (Ramseyer, 1994). The political risk of losing power
in a continued electoral system forces American politicians to stand for the independence of judges.
A related literature investigates the process of juristocracy, an increasing trend of empowering judiciary
worldwide. The main aspect of this process is granting the power of constitutional review to judiciary,
especially to the supreme court and the constitutional court. The explanation provided for this question,
similar to political approach to judicial independence, is that politics matters. Ginsburg seeks the root of
empowering judiciary in political competition: “the more defused politics are, the more space courts have in
which to operate. In contrast, where a dominant disciplined political party holds power, judicial review is
more constrained” (Ginsbureg, 2003. p.18). The biggest threat to judicial power, as well as its independence,
comes from politicians who are willing to suppress any restriction made by the judiciary. The only factor
that resists against this willingness, is the pressure of other powerful politicians. Politicians who face a
probability of being overthrown by rivals, empower the judiciary to ensure their long run benefits.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Indicators of Institutional Protection for Judicial Independence
The first and main indicator is the constitutional protection index I calculated from The Comparative
Constitutions Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007). The Project provides information on the
characteristics of written constitutions, both current and historical, for most independent states since 1789.
The indicator of interest, CONSTITUTION, is made from nine components representing the constitutional
provision for: (1) the stability of the judicial system, (2) the explicit declaration of judicial independence,
(3) extra powers granted to the judiciary (two subcomponents), (4) the selection process of the chief justice
of the highest ordinary court (three subcomponents), (5) tenure of the chief justice of the highest ordinary
court, (6) the selection process of other justices of the highest ordinary court (three subcomponents), (7)
tenure of other justices of the highest ordinary court, (8) the selection process of judges of ordinary courts
(three subcomponents), and (9) tenure of judges of ordinary courts. A full description of each component is
provided in the Appendix.
The first component represents the stability of the judicial system. It is equal to one if the judicial
system is explicitly addressed in the constitution, zero otherwise. The second component shows the indicator
of an explicit declaration of judicial independence in the constitution. The third component is the indicator
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of extra powers granted to the judiciary in the constitution. These powers mainly include the power to
supervise elections, the ability to impeach executive officials, the power to determine the constitutionality
of political parties, anti-corruption power, and the power to review treaties and states of emergencies. They
also include whether the politicians have authority to change the results of courts. The fourth, fifth and
sixth components represent the nomination and selection process of the chief justice of the highest ordinary
court, other justices of the highest ordinary court, and judges of ordinary courts, respectively. If more
than one political or judicial body are involved in nomination and approval process, the judiciary will
be more independent. Moreover, if the parties who are involved in nomination process differ from those
who approve the judges, judicial independence is more likely to obtain. Finally, the seventh, eighth, and
ninth components represent the life tenure for the chief justice of the highest ordinary court, other justices
of the highest ordinary court, and judges of ordinary courts, respectively. The overall index of judicial
independence, CONSTITUTION, is the sum of all the components.
I also define sub-indexes using some of these components. CONSSEL, the index of the selection process,
is the summation of three indexes of the nomination/approval process for the judges of the highest court and
ordinary courts. CONSTEN is the index of tenure of the judges of the highest court and ordinary courts.
CONSPOW is the index of extra power granted to the judiciary and whether the decision of highest court
is final. Finally, CONSIND is the component that represents an explicit declaration of independence in the
constitution. All indicators are normalized to 0-1.
The second indicator of institutional protection is the “de jure judicial independence index” of Feld
and Voigt (2003). This variable was extracted from formal law and legal texts including the Constitutions of
countries. Feld and Voigt gathered data through questionnaires sent to country experts asking information on
the legal structure. The questions covered only the status of the highest court in each country. The final index
combines 12 variables that represent the position of the highest court in the constitution, the appointment
process of justices in the highest court, the tenure of justices, renewable terms of justices, salaries of justices,
accessibility of the court, responsibilities of any single members of the court, the ability of the court to
review the constitution, and whether the court has to publish the opinions. The measure ranges from 0
(dependency) to 1 (perfect independence). This index covers more details of legal structure (e.g., salaries
and responsibilities of the members) and uses all written legal texts including the constitution, but does not
cover ordinary courts. Moreover, its coverage of countries is limited compared with the CONSTITUTION
index created in this paper.
I use five components of the Feld and Voigt indicator: appointment process (DEJUREAPP), tenure of
judges (DEJURETEN), removal process of judges (DEJUREREM), control of the court over the salary of
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justices (DEJURESAL), and the power of judicial review (DEJUREPOW). These components are normalized
to 0-1, where one represents the highest level of independence.
Feld and Voigt (2003) also provided “de facto judicial independence,” which was defined as “indepen-
dence factually enjoyed by judges and justices.” This index is the combination of eight factors representing:
the effective term length of justices, changes in the number of judges, actual development of the supreme
court’s budget, changes in the legal foundation of the supreme court, and the dependency of decisions of the
supreme court to actions of other branches. This indicator shows the institutional protection for judges as is
in the real world. For instance a judge in the supreme court may be granted life tenure but in reality she is
removed for political reasons. In this sense there is a difference between de jure and de facto independence.
The index is normalized to 0-1, where one represents the highest level of independence.
1.3.2 Indicators of Political Competition
The main index of political competition is the POLITY2 indicator of the Polity Project (Marshal and
Jaggers, 2005). The project was designed to codify the authority characteristics of states in the world. The
recent version of the polity project, Polity IV, provides several indicators for measuring these characteristics,
among them indicators of democracy and autocracy.
Democracy, as defined in Polity IV, includes three essential interdependent elements. The first element
is “the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about
alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of
power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts
of political participation.” Autocracy as defined in Polity IV is the ability of the state to “sharply restrict
or suppress competitive political competition.”
Based on these concepts, polity IV defines measures of: (a) competitiveness and openness of executive
recruitment, (b) constraints on the chief executive, (c) competitiveness of political participation, and (d)
regulation of participation. DEMOCRACY and AUTHOCRACY indices are made from these components.
Each of these two is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The overall index of political competition,
POLITY2 index, is the difference between AUTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY. Therefore, POLITY2 varies
between -10 and +10. I normalized this index to 0-1, where a higher score represents higher level democracy.
It covers every political unit from 1800, therefore, it is suitable for panel analysis
The second indicator of political competition is the Freedom House index of political rights (FRHSPLRI).
This index combines three components: (a) Electoral Process, (b) Political Pluralism and Participation, and
(c) Functioning of Government. These components cover several measures of political competition includ-
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ing whether there are free and fair elections for choosing the head of the executive branch and legislative
members, the existence and role of the oppositions in elections, regulation of people’s choice, real power
of the elected officials, and measures of corruption and transparency of government. The index covers 189
countries from 1972 and ranges from 7 (no political rights) to 1 (comprehensive political rights). I normalize
the index to 0-1 where higher values represent more democracy.
1.3.3 Decisional Judicial Independence
The main variables of judicial independence are the components of Legal Structure and Security of Property
Rights indicator of Economic Freedom of the World report (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006). Legal Structure
and Security of Property Rights includes five components: (A) Judicial independence, (B) Impartial courts,
(C) Protection of intellectual property, (D) Military interference in rule of law and the political process, and
(E) Integrity of the legal system. The first variable, judicial independence, is the answer to whether the
judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes. The second
component, impartial courts, addresses the existence of a trusted legal framework for private businesses to
challenge the legality of government actions or regulation. The last three components measure the ability of
courts to protect intellectual property, military interference in rule of law, and integrity of the legal system.
These omponents were assembled from two primary sources: the International Country Risk Guide and
the Global Competitiveness Report. The former is computed by an in-house panel of experts whereas the
latter is based on surveys of leading business executives. The overall index is available from 1970 to 2000
for five-year intervals and from 2000 onward annually. All components are available only for 1995 and 2000-
2004. The coverage of countries increases during time. In 2004 it covers 130 countries. All indicators are
normalized to 0-1 where a higher score represents better performance.
I also use two sets of variables that capture the judicial power relative to the power of politicians.
These two infamous indicators are: the rule of law index of the Governance Matters project (Kaufman,
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006) and the rule of law index of the “Freedom House.” The rule of law index
of the Governance Matters project covers 213 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually
for 2002-2005. The indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of
governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. The rule of law
index is assembled from indicators including, but not limited to, judicial independence, legal safeguards, and
trust in the judiciary for the protection of property rights from 20 sources.9 The Freedom House indicator
of the rule of law is made from the information that experts provide for following specific questions: (1) Is
9Global Insight, Economist Intelligent Unit, World Economic Forum, Amnesty International, Political Risk Service, and
Merchant International Group are among them.
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there an independent judiciary? (2)Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police
under direct civilian control? (3) Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
and (4) Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?
As before I normalize the indexes to 0-1.
1.4 Econometric Model
The following econometric model is the basis of the regression analysis whenever panel data is available:
Jit = αJit−1 + γyit−1 +X
′
it−1β + µt + δi + uit (1.1)
where Jit is the judicial independence score of country i in period t. The lagged value of judicial
independence captures persistence in judicial independence. The variable of interest is yit−1, which is the
lagged values of institutional protection or political competition indices. I use the lagged values instead
of current value to capture the “causal effect.” I also use instrumental variable regression to address this
issue in more detail. The parameter γ measures the causal effect of the variable of interest on judicial
independence. All control variables are included in the vector Xit−1. Potential country-specific effects, the
factors that vary country by country but are constant over time, are captured in δi. History, culture, legal
origin, and geography are among the features that fit in this definition. On the other hand, µt contain the
effect of common shocks to all countries in specific years. The error term, uit, captures all other omitted
factors with E(uit) = 0 for all i and t.
The first estimator in the panel analysis is a pooled OLS, which is model (1) without µt and δi for
time and country effects, respectively. This model provides a consistent estimation of γ if the actual model
does not have country and time effects. Even in this case the error term is likely to be correlated over
time for a given individual. This causes a downward bias in standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
Pooled OLS gives a biased estimator if there are correlations between the error term δi+uit and explanatory
variables X or y. A commonly used estimator that results in consistent estimation of γ, is the fixed effect
estimator. It treats µt and δi as unobserved random variables that are potentially correlated with observed
variables and eliminates their effect. The fixed effect estimator will be consistent if Cov(yit−1, ut) = 0 and
Cov(xjit−1, ut) = 0 for all j as T →∞ where x
j refers to a single control variable in vector X.
Using lagged values of explanatory variables makes it possible to estimate the “causal” effect of insti-
tutional protection and political competition on judicial independence. But it does not solve the problem
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of reverse causality. γ captures the effect of explanatory variable y on judicial independence. But it is
quite possible that judicial structure affects the explanatory variable. In technical terms, we might have
Cov(yit−1, uit) 6= 0. In this case, even fixed-effect estimates are biased. The direction of the bias depends
on whether Cov(yit−1, uit) is positive or negative. The standard method to handle endogenous regressors is
instrumental variables analysis. Obtaining instruments with the panel data is easier than in cross section
data, since regressors in previous periods might be used as instruments. They are less likely to be correlated
with current variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005. Chapter 22). I use longer lagged values of political
competition as instruments to address the estimation bias due to reverse causality.
The last technical issue is caused by including the lagged dependent variable Jit−1. The model is then
a dynamic model. Time-series correlation is now induced directly by Jit−1 in addition to the indirect effect
via fixed effects considered above. In this case, the OLS estimator and fixed effect estimator are inconsistent.
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) to address this issue. This
estimator results in a consistent estimate of coefficients.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 The Effect of Institutional Protection
I start with estimating an OLS model to study the effect of institutional protection on judicial indepen-
dence. Table 2 shows the basic results: institutional protections do not affect judicial independence. The
dependent variable is the judicial independence indicator of Economic Freedom of the World Report. The
explanatory variable in the first part of the table is the overall index of constitutional protection introduced
in section 4. The OLS regression results show that the index of constitutional protection has a weak nega-
tive effect. This result is contrary to the prediction of the existing literature, which indicates that judicial
independence depends, to a great degree, on the arrangements made to protect the judges.
The significance of coefficient and adjusted R-squared (0.03) show a weak association in the opposite
direction. Inclusion of control variables for income per capita and durability of the political system (obtained
from the Polity IV project) increases adjusted R-squared considerably (0.457), but does not change the result.
The table shows that wealthier countries and countries with more stable states have a more independent
judiciary. Columns 4 and 5 of table 2 show the results of the OLS regressions using the overall indicator of
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights. The previous result still holds. Judicial independence is not
affected by institutional protections for judges. The correlation is weak and opposite to what the existing
literature predicts, and disappears once control variables are included.
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The constitutional protection indicator covers the constitutions but not other legal texts. There are
many countries in which the institutional protections for judges are left to be provided by ordinary legal
texts. For instance, most constitutions do not contain any arrangements for ordinary courts. To address this
shortcoming, I repeat, in second part of table 2, the OLS regressions using another indicator of institutional
protection: the de jure judicial independence indicator of Feld and Voigt (2003).10 This indicator covers
constitutions as well as other legal texts (see the details in section 4). The results of the OLS regression
show no change in basic findings. Similar to previous analysis, there is no insignificant relationship between
institutional protection and judicial independence. This lack of association holds after inclusion of control
variables. It also holds for regressions that use the indicator of Legal Structure and Security of Property
Rights as the dependent variable. To summarize, the results in table 2 show no evidence of effectiveness of
institutional protection for judicial independence.
Each indicator of institutional protection covers several characteristics, such as tenure, selection method,
salary and budget, and extra powers. One possible explanation for the lack of relationship between indicators
of institutional protection and judicial independence may be the fact that the indicators are composite
measures. It is possible that some of these components don’t have any impact on judicial independence. For
instance, the explicit declaration of judicial independence in the constitution is easy to provide for politicians
as long as judges have no real power. Also life tenure would be of no use if the results of courts could be
easily changed. Therefore, we expect these variables to have no significant effect. To address the affect of
each component, tables 3 and 4 provide the OLS results for components of two indicators of institutional
protection. Table 3 presents the effect of components of constitutional protection on judicial independence.
These components are indicators of: (a) explicit declaration of independence in the constitution (CONSIND),
(b) extra power of judiciary and whether the decisions of judges are final (CONSPOW), (c) nomination
method (CONSNOM), (d) approval method (CONSAPR), (e) whether the parties involved in the nomination
and approval are the same, and (f) life tenure. Table 4 presents the OLS results using five components of de
jure judicial independence as explanatory variables. These components are indicators of: (a) appointment
process, (b) tenure of judges, (c) removal of judges, (d) control over salary, and (e) power to review the
constitution.
None of the components of constitutional protection nor any component of de jure institutional pro-
tection has a significant effect on judicial independence. Some components, for instance, the index for the
nomination of judges, have a positive association with judicial independence, but it disappears after control-
ling for income. The only variable that has a statistically significant effect on judicial independence is the
10Although the authors name this indicator “judicial independence indicator,” it is similar to what I consider as “institutional
protection for judicial independence.”
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variable of explicit declaration of judicial independence in constitution. This variable has a negative effect,
which is significant at the 5% confidence level, even after controling for income and durability of the political
system.
Some institutional arrangements, such as a proper selection method, might increase the power of
judges because they restrict intervention of politicians in the judicial process. But a declaration of judicial
independence in the constitution does not guarantee any real power to judges. Therefor, it is not surprising
to see countries in which the constitution provides a statement regarding the independence, yet denying any
real support for rule of law. Table 5 presents a sample of countries in which there is an explicit constitutional
declaration of judicial independence and other countries whose constitutions do not contain such a statement.
It also provides measures of rule of law from two sources, the Governance Matters Project and Freedom
House Inc. as well as the index of Freedom House index of political right. There are many countries -
North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan, Cuba, Democratic of Congo, and Turkmenistan among them - in which the
property rights are not protected properly and rule of law indicators show a very poor situation, yet there
is an explicit provision of independence for judges in the constitution. On the other side, there are some
countries with excellent political and civil right record without explicit support of judicial independence in
their constitutions. Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands are among them. In other words explicit
support of judicial independence is not a good predictor of the outcome of judicial and political performance.
Institutional protection indicators used in tables 2, 3 and 4 are drawn from the constitutions of countries
and ordinary legal texts. They are, by definition, “law on paper.” The reality can be different. Politicians
have a great incentive to show, at least on paper, that they support democratic values and people’s rights.
Although many studies look into legal texts for factors affecting the judicial independence, it could be a
valid argument to go beyond the texts and look at the real world. Constitutions might grant considerable
authority to the judiciary; yet judges might have little actual power and independence. To capture the
difference between “de jure” and ”de facto” judicial independence, I analyze judicial independence using
the de facto indicator provided by Feld and Voigt (2003). The regression results in table 6 show that
providing real support for the judiciary has a positive effect on judicial independence. Variations in the
de facto measure of institutional support explains about 18% of variations in judicial independence. The
level of development, measured by per capita income, is a much more important determinant of judicial
independence than institutional support. Once I controlled for per capita income and the durability of
political system, the association between the de facto institutional protection and judicial independence
disappears.
To evaluate the impact of institutional protection on judicial independence, table 7 presents the results
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of pooled OLS and fixed effect estimation for five-year interval data. Because of the lack of long-term data
on judicial independence, I use the overall indicator of Legal Structure (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006), for
which data is available from 1970. As mentioned before, the correlation between this overall index and the
index of judicial independence is high enough (0.93) to use them interchangeably.
The first three columns of table 7 show the results of pooled OLS, and the last three columns present the
fixed effect results. In either model, institutional protection has no significant effect on judicial performance
once I control for income per capita and durability of political system. Institutional protection alone (with
a constant) can not explain the variation in judicial performance (adjusted R-squared is about 0.015). Per
capita income and the lagged value of judicial independence explain about 71% of variations in judicial
performance, but the effect of institutional protection decreases and becomes statistically insignificant. The
fixed-effects models (Models 4, 5, and 6) confirm these results. Once I control for country effects, even
without controlling for per capita income, the effect of institutinal protection on judicial performance becomes
insignificant.
The effect of the lagged values of the dependent variable is considerable and quite significant, both in
pooled OLS and the fixed-effects model, although it drops in the fixed-effects model due to fishing out the
country effects. There is a strong tendency toward persistence in judicial performance. Judicial performance
is, as expected, very stable. Its major determinant, even in five-year time intervals, is its lagged value.
Institutional protection does not have a role in shaping the judicial independence.
1.5.2 Political Competition
The second approach to the conditions of judicial independence is the political competition approach.
Based on this theory, the main determinants of judicial independence are the actual relationships between
the judiciary and the political branches of the state. Politicians have power and tools to enforce their will
on the judiciary. Only the other powerful politicians can prevent this interference. In a democratic state, by
definition, no politician stays in office forever. Any office holder is subject to competition by other potential
candidates. Therefore, politicians have an incentive to empower the judiciary to ensure their long-term
benefits. This section investigates the effect of political competition on judicial independence.
Similar to the panel data study of the last section, I use data on Legal Structure as the dependent
variable. I use two measures of political competition: Polity IV composite index of political competition
(POLITY2) and Freedom House index of political right (FRHSPLRI). Tables 8 and 9 show the results of
pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators for these two indicators.
Political competition has a positive effect on judicial independence. This effect decreases once I intro-
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duce control variables. Per capita income and durability of political system are the most influential control
variables. Controlling for these variables decreases the coefficient of POLITY2 index from 0.24 to 0.08. Vari-
ations in political competition explain only 20% of variations in judicial independence. Income per capita
and durability increase the explantory power of the model to more than 54%.
Model 3 in both tables presents the results of dynamic models by introducing the lagged values of
judicial performance. The coefficient is highly significant and indicates a strong tendency to persistence
in judicial independence. Once the lagged values of judicial independence are considered, the effect and
significance of political competition decreases significantly. Short-run effect of POLITY2 is 0.024 (with a
standard error of 0.014). This indicates that a 10% increase in the democracy index is associated with an
increase of less than 0.2 percent increase in judicial independence. This effect is higher in the long-run,
because of the effect of the lagged value of judicial independence. Since the lagged value has a coefficient of
0.54 and is highly significant, the long run effect of a 10% increase in democracy is almost twice as big as
the short run effect 0.002/(1− 0.54) ≈ 0.004.
Pooled OLS estimation has two shortcomings. First, it does not address the issue of country-specific
characteristics that affect both judicial independence and political competition. Each country has a unique
history of economic, political, and legal development that affect judicial independence of that country.
To address this issue, I use fixed-effects models that control for country effects. The fixed-effects
estimator removes the effect of heterogeneous variables that represent specific features of each country.
More formally, this model controls for δi in equation (1). The last three columns of tables 8 and 9 present
the fixed-effects models. As expected, specific country effects explain a big part of the variations in judicial
independence (more than 70%); yet the effect of political competition stays highly significant. The last
model presents the fixed-effects estimator with lagged values of judicial independence. Similar to the pooled
OLS, the result of this model shows a highly significant effect of the lagged values, although the magnitude
reduces to less than a half. Once I control for the lagged values of judicial independence, the coefficient of
political competition loses its significance but is still positive. The long-run effect of polticial competition is
almost the same for the pooled data model. For instance, a 10% increase in Polity IV index causes a 0.38%
(0.003/(1− 0.2) ≈ 0.0038) increase in judicial independence index in long-run.
Second, pooled OLS does not address the reverse causality. Even if I control for country-specific
fixed effects, there still exists a possibility of reverse causality: judicial independence might affect political
competition. Therefore, the pooled OLS and fixed-effects models are biased due to the presence of endogenous
regressors.
The reverse causality biases the coefficients in both pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimation. Using the
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lagged values of political competition does not remove reverse causality. Instrumental variable estimation
is a well-known remedy for this issue. The first and second columns in table 10 present the results of
instrumental variables estimation using longer lagged values of political competition as instruments. As
mentioned earlier, these longer lagged are more likely to be exogenous. These results are consistent with the
results of simple fixed-effects models: political competition has a positive impact on judicial independence.
The long-run effect is even bigger: a 10% increase in the political competition index is associated with a
1.1% (0.009/(1− 0.212) ≈ 0.011)increase in the measure of judicial independence.
The last column of table 10 presents the results of Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic model (Arellano and
Bond, 1991), which removes the inconsistency of estimated coefficients due to inclusion of the lagged values
of he dependent variable. The long-run effect of a 10% increase in he political competition index is similar
to what the previous results showed: a 10% increase in the political competition index is associated with a
0.6 percent (0.005/(1− 0.213) ≈ 0.006) increase in judicial independence.11
1.6 Conclusion
In searching for the conditions of judicial independence, I investigate the effect of two variables: institutional
protection and political competition. Contrary to the most part of the existing literature, I find no empirical
evidence in favor of the impact of institutional arrangement, in constitution or ordinary laws, on judicial
independence. Political competition, on the other hand, has a positive impact on judicial independence.
This impact holds after introducing several control variables, controlling for country specific effects, using
instrumental variable estimators, and estimating dynamic models.
The results have important policy implications. The international organizations such as the World
Bank who attempt to improve the judicial performance in developing and less-developed countries should
not approach the judiciary in isolation. Judicial system is an institution among many other institutions.
Improving political competition will facilitate the independence of judges.
The performance of the judicial system is very stable. Country-specific factors are responsible for a
big part of variations in judicial performance. Policies to improve judicial independence and performance
should be designed with specific attention to these specific factors. The benefit of reform efforts will appear
only in long-run.
There are many possibilities to improve this study. Due to the lack of data I used proxies of judicial
independence. I also used an unbalanced panel in which the observations for less developed countries were
11The results of the Arellano-Bond model should be used with cautious since the serial correlation tests show a strong serial
correlation in error terms for first order lags. The hypothesis of second order serial correlation is rejected. Also the assumption
of over identification is rejected.
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not sufficient. Better data and wider coverage of countries will provide more precise results. Moreover, the
persistence of judicial independence and the effects of country-specific conditions are distinguished features
of judiciary. More studies are needed to examine this path-dependency of countries.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Variable Description
Variable Description
CONSTITUTION
The indicator of Constitutional Protection for judicial independence. A composite index of
16 components (see the Appendix for details). This variable and all its components and other
variables made from these components are available for most independent states since 1789.
Normalized 0-1.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
CONSIND
The indicator of explicit declaration of judicial independence in constitution. It is equal to
variable V02 in the Appendix. Normalized 0-1.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
CONSPOW
The indicator of extra power granted to judiciary by constitution and whether the results of
courts are final. It is equal to the average of two variables, V031 and v032 in the Appendix.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
CONSNOM
The indicator of nomination of judges. It is the average of three nomination variables: V041,
V051, V061, in the Appendix; normalized 0-1.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
CONSAPR
The indicator of approval of judges. It is the average of three approval variables: V042, V052,
V062, in the Appendix; normalized 0-1.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
CONSNOMAPR
The indicator of nomination-approval of judges. It is the average of three nomination/approval
variables: V043, V053, V063, in the Appendix; normalized 0-1.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
CONSTEN
The indicator of tenure of judges. It is the average of three life tenure variables: V07, V08,
V09, in the Appendix; normalized 0-1.
Source: The Constitutional Project by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007).
DEJURE
The indicator of institutional protection of Feld and Voigt. The authors call it “de jure judicial
independence”. It is a composite measure of 12 components; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
DEJUREAPP
The indicator of appointment process; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
DEJURETEN
The indicator of tenure of judges; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
DEJUREREM
The indicator of process of removal of judges; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
DEJURESAL
The indicator of control over salary and budget; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
DEJUREPOW
The indicator of extra power granted to supreme court judges; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
DEFACTO
The indicator of actual institutional protection of Feld and Voigt. The authors call it “de
facto judicial independence”. It is a composite measure of 8 components; normalized 0-1.
Source: Feld and Voigt (2003).
22
Table 1 (cont.)
Variable Description
EFWLS
The indicator of Legal Structure from Economic Freedom of the World Report; normalized
0-1.
Source: Gwartney and Lawson, 2006
EFWJI
The indicator of Judicial Independence from Economic Freedom of the World Report; normal-
ized 0-1.
Source: Gwartney and Lawson, 2006
GM5RL
The indicator of Rule of Law form Governance Matter V project; normalized 0-1.
Source: Kaufman, et al. (2006).
FRHSRLLW The indicator of Rule of Law from Freedom House Inc. ; normalized 0-1.
Source: Freedom House Inc.
FRHSPLRI The indicator of Political Rights from Freedom House Inc; normalized 0-1.
Source: Freedom House Inc.
POLITY2
The indicator of Political Competition from Polity IV Project; normalized 0-1.
Source: Marshal and Jaggers (2005).
DURABLE
The indicator of Durability of political regime from Polity IV Project. It is the number of
years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the POLITY
score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack
of stable political institutions.
Source: Marshal and Jaggers (2005).
LGDPPC Log of per capita income; 2000 $ US.
Source: The World Bank.
Table 1.2: OLS Using Two Different Measures of Institutional Protection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
CONSTITUTION -0.321** -0.100 -0.010 -0.355** -0.049
(0.158) (0.128) (0.128) (0.124) (0.081)
LOGGDPPC NO YES YES NO YES
DURABLE NO NO YES NO YES
Observations 102 100 97 125 117
Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.421 0.457 0.055 0.639
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
DE JURE 0.082 -0.204 -0.125 0.079 -0.151
(0.164) (0.126) (0.123) (0.138) (0.087)
LOGGDPPC NO YES YES NO YES
DURABLE NO NO YES NO YES
Observations 88 86 85 94 91
Adjusted R-squared -0.009 0.462 0.499 -0.007 0.640
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Models 1, 2, 3: Dependent variable: Judicial Independence index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWJI).
Models 4,5: Dependent variable: Legal Structure index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWLS).
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Table 1.3: OLS Regression Using Components of Constitutional Protection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CONSIND -0.102**
(0.046)
CONSPOW 0.024
(0.061)
CONSNOM 0.053
(0.061)
CONSAPR -0.126
(0.142)
CONSNOMAPR 0.015
(0.050)
CONSTEN -0.026
(0.057)
LOGGDPPC YES YES YES YES YES YES
DURABLE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
Adjusted R-squared 0.484 0.457 0.461 0.461 0.457 0.458
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Dependent variable: Judicial Independence index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWJI).
Model 1: The institutional protection indicator is the index of declaration of independence.
Model 2: The institutional protection indicator is the index of extra power of judiciary.
Model 3: The institutional protection indicator is the index of nomination process.
Model 4: The institutional protection indicator is the index of approval process.
Model 5: The institutional protection indicator is the index of parties involved in nomination/approval.
Model 6: The institutional protection indicator is the index of life tenure.
Table 1.4: OLS Regression Using Components of Feld and Voigt Indicator
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
DEIUREAPP -0.091
(0.061)
DEIURETEN 0.055
(0.083)
DEIUREREM 0.046
(0.045)
DEIURESAL 0.035
(0.041)
DEIUREPOW -0.066
(0.048)
LOGGDPPC YES YES YES YES YES
DURABLE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 79 78 78 77 79
Adjusted R-squared 0.493 0.506 0.506 0.505 0.484
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Dependent variable: Judicial Independence index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWJI).
Model 1: The institutional protection indicator is the index of appointment of judges.
Model 2: The institutional protection indicator is the index of tenure of judges.
Model 3: The institutional protection indicator is the index of removal process of judges.
Model 4: The institutional protection indicator is the index of control over salaries of judges.
Model 5: The institutional protection indicator is the index of power of constitutional review.
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Table 1.5: Explicit Declaration of Independence in the Constitution and Rule of Law
Countries WITH explicit constitutional support of judicial independence and low rule of law indicators.
GM5RL FRHSRLLW FRHSPLRI
Cuba 0.285 0.0625 0
Equatorial Guinea 0.276 0.0625 0
Myanmar 0.154 0 0
Korea, Dem. Rep. 0.286 0 0
Sudan 0.184 0 0
Syrian Arab Republic 0.406 0.0625 0
Togo 0.302 0.0625 0.167
Turkmenistan 0.226 0 0
Uzbekistan 0.262 0 0.167
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.162 0 0
Zimbabwe 0.192 0.0625 0
Countries WITHOUT explicit constitutional support of judicial independence and high rule of law indicators.
GM5RL FRHSRLLW FRHSPLRI
Canada 0.858 0.9375 1
Switzerland 0.902 0.9375 1
Iceland 0.904 1 1
Luxembourg 0.898 1 1
Netherlands 0.856 0.9375 1
Norway 0.892 1 1
New Zealand 0.884 0.9375 1
Sweden 0.882 1 1
GM5RL: Rule of Law indicator if Governance Matters V; Normalized: 0(worst) to 1(best).
FRHSRLLW: Rule of Law indicator of Freedom House; Normalized: 0(worst) to 1(best).
FRHSPLRI: Political Right indicator of Freedom House; Normalized: 0(worst) to 1(best).
Table 1.6: OLS Using De Facto Measure of Institutional Protection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
DEFACTO 0.445*** 0.153 0.099 0.393*** 0.005
(0.108) (0.098) (0.097) (0.091) (0.070)
LOGGDPPC NO YES YES NO YES
DURABLE NO NO YES NO YES
Observations 75 73 72 80 77
Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.483 0.510 0.184 0.557
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Models 1, 2, 3: Dependent variable: Judicial Independence index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWJI).
Models 4, 5: Dependent variable: Legal Structure index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWLS).
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Table 1.7: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Results for Institutional Protection: Five-Year Interval
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CONSTITUTIONt−1 -0.168*** 0.006 -0.004 0.042 0.036 -0.013
(0.049) (0.037) (0.030) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057)
JUDIt−1 0.555*** 0.216***
(0.033) (0.042)
LOGGDPPCt−1 NO YES YES NO YES YES
LDURABLE NO YES YES NO NO NO
Observations 730 661 567 730 699 595
Adjusted R-squared 0.015 0.522 0.710 0.709 0.728 0.758
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Models 1, 2, 3: Pooled OLS.
Models 4, 5, 6: Fixed Effect.
Dependent variable: Legal Structure index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWLS).
Table 1.8: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Results for Political Competition Using Polity IV Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
POLITY2t−1 0.239*** 0.080*** 0.024* 0.048*** 0.040** 0.031
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
JUDIt−1 0.540*** 0.200***
(0.033) (0.043)
LOGGDPPCt−1 NO YES YES NO YES YES
LDURABLE NO YES YES NO NO NO
Observations 724 701 597 724 701 597
Adjusted R-squared 0.213 0.541 0.704 0.701 0.714 0.739
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Models 1, 2, 3: Pooled OLS.
Models 4, 5, 6: Fixed Effect.
Dependent variable: Legal Structure index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWLS).
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Table 1.9: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Results for Political Competition Using Freedom House Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
FRHSPLRIt−1 0.291*** 0.098*** 0.030* 0.059** 0.056** 0.023
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
JUDIt−1 0.543*** 0.212***
(0.034) (0.042)
LOGGDPPCt−1 NO YES YES NO YES YES
LDURABLE NO YES YES NO NO NO
Observations 714 651 590 714 684 619
Adjusted R-squared 0.296 0.546 0.707 0.697 0.721 0.751
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Models 1, 2, 3: Pooled OLS.
Models 4, 5, 6: Fixed Effect.
Dependent variable: Legal Structure index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWLS).
Table 1.10: Fixed Effect Instrumental Variable Results for Political Competition Using Polity Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
POLITY2 0.081** 0.091* 0.051
(0.036) (0.051) (0.033)
JUDIt−1 0.205*** 0.213***
(0.045) (0.081)
LOGGDPPCt−1 YES YES YES
Observations 682 582 375
R-squared: Within 0.058 0.136
R-squared: Between 0.611 0.756
R-squared: Overall 0.512 0.621
Serial Correlation(1) (Pr>Z) 0.000
Serial Correlation(2) (Pr>Z) 0.126
Over-identification (Pr>CHI2) 0.000
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in parenthesis show the standard errors.
Models 1, 2: Fixed Effect IV using POLITY2t−1 and POLITY2t−2 as instruments.
Model 3: Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with two lags of dependent variable.
Serial Correlation tests for residuals of order 1 and 2: The Null Hypothesis is NO serial correlation.
Over-identification test: The Null Hypothesis is the existence of over identification.
Dependent variable: Legal Structure index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFWLS).
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Judicial Independence vs. Institutional Protection using Feld and Voigt Index
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Figure 1.2: Judicial Independence vs. Institutional Protection using the CONSTITUTION Index
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Figure 1.3: Judicial Independence vs. Political Competition using Polity Index
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Figure 1.4: Judicial Independence vs. Political Competition using Freedom House Index
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Chapter 2
Judicial Selection in The American
States
2.1 Introduction
An immense body of literature has been developed over the last decades on judicial selection methods.
The debate has mostly focused on the appointive versus elective systems. The main claim has been that
appointive systems provide more independence for judges, whereas elective systems facilitate accountability.
Much of the changes in judicial selection methods in the American states can be interpreted as a trade-off
between accountability and independence (Hanssen, 2004). The conventional wisdom holds that appointive
systems are superior, because judges in these systems are more independent than their colleagues in elective
systems. Yet the question of the impact of selection methods on judicial performance is still an unanswered
question. It is partly because the question of relative merits of each system is an empirical question. The
empirical literature on this subject is surprisingly rare, and the results are highly inconclusive. Moreover,
that literature has almost entirely focused on the dichotomy of appointive versus elective systems. The
impact of the different types of elective and appointive systems, and, more importantly, the effect of a merit
selection method on judicial behavior has been absent from the literature.
In recent years, scholars have used empirical methods to investigate a variety of theories on the impact
of selection methods on how judges rule, how litigants decide to bring a case to court, and what factors
affect the performance of the judiciary. On the one hand, appointed judges do not face campaign pressures,
so they are more likely to decide cases merely based on their own discretion, while elected judges might
consider public interest - or the interest of politically powerfully groups - as well. This narrows the range
of the judicial outcome in elective systems. In other words, potential litigants face more uncertainty about
the courts’ outcome in appointive than elective systems, and bring more litigation to court (Hanssen, 1999).
On the other hand, independent judges are more likely to rule based on law, they stay longer in office, and
act more professionally. Altogether, one might expect more or less litigation in appointive systems. Hanssen
used a simple regression analysis on pooled data to examine this issue. He found higher litigation rates in
supreme courts of appointive states. He did not find any significant difference in litigation rates of lower
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courts.
Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2007) examined the impact of selection methods on the behavior of judges
using another theory and data set. They argued that elective judges need to show off their productivity. The
authors expected to find more opinions per judge in elective states than in elective states. They pooled data
from 1998 to 2000 to run a simple regression, and found that judges subject to partisan elections wrote the
most opinions, followed by judges in merit systems, non-partisan elections, and finally appointed systems.
I revisit these two issues using new datasets and a different empirical approach. Using time-series
datasets, instead of cross section, and program evaluation methods, instead of simple regression, I examine
the impact of switching in selection methods on the behavior of judges and litigants. I specifically focus on
the effect of switching to merit selection. If the merit selection systems provide more independence for judges
and cause more uncertainty, I should find a structural change on the parameters of a model on litigation
rates in states where there was a change from elective systems to merit plan. Moreover, if elected judges are
more active, I should find a change in number of opinions written by judges after switching to a merit plan.
I applied Chow test to evaluate the existence of structural breaks in known dates. I also applied sup-
Wald test to examine the existence of a structural break in an unknown date. I used asymptotic critical
values as well as small sample critical values from Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, I estimated potential
break dates using sup-Wald and lest square methods.
I used three measures of litigation rates: the amount of litigation per 100,000 population in the court(s)
of last resort (COLR); the amount of litigation per 100,000 population in all high courts - including court(s)
of last resort and intermediate appellate court(s) (IAC); and the amount of civil litigation per 100,000
population in general jurisdiction trial courts (GJTC). I also used the average number of opinions written
by justices of the court(s) of last resort as a measure of productivity of these justices. I examined the
changes in the parameters of autoregressive models on these variables in the following states: Connecticut,
New Mexico, and Tennessee (switched from partisan election to merit plan); Oklahoma (switched from non-
partisan election to merit plan); Rhode Island (switched from appointive system to merit plan); and South
Carolina (a slight change in selection mechanism occurred).
The results were mixed. Although the results on the litigation rates in high courts showed evidence of
structural changes, the direction of these changes did not perfectly match with the uncertainty theory. In
some states (Connecticut and Tennessee) switching from partisan election to a merit plan caused significant
rise in the litigation rates, whereas in others (New Mexico) the litigation rates dropped. In all these states
there was strong evidence of structural changes. Litigation rates in the states where the selection methods
changed from non-partisan election to a merit plan did not show strong evidence of structural change.
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Moreover, as the theory predicted, switching from an appointive system to a merit plan (in Rhode Island)
did not cause a regime change. The possibility of multiple changes in litigation rates can not be rejected,
and the effect of other factors, such as changes in state’s political structure, might be considerable.
With one exception, Tennessee, the results on the number of opinions written by highest court justices
was consistent with the theory. Switching from an elective system to a merit plan reduced the number of
opinions. The existence of a structural break is evident. Justices in merit selection systems, unlike their
counterparts in the elective systems, did not need to identify themselves as hard working-judges.
These results confirm that switching in the selection method has significant impacts on the behavior of
judges and litigants. They show stronger evidence for a change in the behavior of judges than for a change
in the behavior of litigants. The results of this paper also show that the existing theories, while clarifying
important aspects of judicial behavior, fail to correctly predict the details. More sophisticated theories and
more empirical investigations will provide more information on judicial behavior.
The next section provides the history of the changes in selection methods in American states. It also
provides the theoretical background and a short summary of existing literature. Section 3 and 4 introduce
the data sets and empirical methods, respectively. Section 5 presents the results. The last section concludes
and offers some possible extensions. The appendix provides information on the changes in judicial selection
methods in American states since 1970.
2.2 Theory and Literature
2.2.1 Selection Methods in American States
Long debate over the impact of judicial selection methods on judicial performance has focused on elective
versus appointive systems. Each of these selection methods satisfies a favored characteristic of a well-
functioning judiciary. An elective method improves the accountability of judges to constituents, whereas
the appointive method is more likely to provide greater independence. In other words, the dichotomy of
elective-appointive selection methods can be translated to the dichotomy of accountability-independence
(Hanssen, 1999).
Ideally, elections ensure that people with mainstream views become judges. Voters use elections to
choose judges with desirable characteristics, and, more importantly, to punish those who deviate from
desirable behavior. The election process, therefore, promotes the accountability of judges. Alternatively, an
ideal appointive system chooses independent judges, because appointed judges are free from public pressures
and do not face competitors. These judges can devote their effort to implementing the law without the fear
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of being punished. Appointive judges, as a result, are more independent and can act as professionals.
In the real world, however, elections do not automatically lead to an accountable judiciary. Most
people do not vote in judicial elections; most people do not have enough information about candidates; most
people are unable to evaluate the complicated judicial results; and, not surprisingly, most people believe that
when judges are elected, they are subject to influence from the campaign contributors who made the judges’
election possible (Geyh, 2003). The dependency of the candidates on campaign contributors has been a
source of concern, mainly because the amount of money spent in these campaigns has enormously increased
in recent years. Not surprisingly, critiques consider these payments as investments for which the investors
expect a return in the future. The return, ruling in favor of contributors, reduces general accountability.
The ideal picture of the independent appointed judges also needs several qualifications. Politicians may
appoint judges who favor their political views, which obviously violates the independence. In the early years
of the the history of the United States, 1790-1845, this fact stimulated switching from appointive selection
methods (mostly by legislatures and in some states by executive branches) to elective systems (Hanssen,
2004). In recent years, the appointive judges have been less vulnerable to the direct control of politicians.
Yet none of the American states that adopted elective methods switched back to the appointive systems.
Instead, most of them combined elements of appointive systems with some features of elective methods. The
new selection method, the merit plan,1 is a composite selection method, designed to resolve shortcomings of
both pure appointive and pure elective systems.
Scholars, judges, and independent legal organizations favor the merit selection methods for several
reasons. For instance, the American Judicature Society points to the advantages of merit selections over the
other selection methods, especially election.2 These reasons, although more ideal than real, encompass some
facts about the virtues of the merit plan:
• Merit selection not only sifts out unqualified applicants, it searches out the most qualified.
• Judicial candidates are spared the potentially compromising process of party slating, raising money,
and campaigning.
• Professional qualifications are emphasized and political credentials are de-emphasized.
• Judges chosen through merit selection do not find themselves trying cases brought by attorneys who
gave them campaign contributions.
1Sometimes called Kales Plan (due to its origin that is traced back to Albert M. Kales) Missouri plan (Missouri was the
first state to implement it) or commission plan (due to the fact that in all types of it there is a commission who nominates the
candidates).
2Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best Judges. Available online at: http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs
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• Highly qualified applicants will be more willing to be selected and to serve under a system of merit
selection because they will not have to compromise themselves to get elected.
Today, a majority of states choose their judges through merit plans. Although these methods are not
identical across the states, they share common features. The kernel of a merit plan consists of a permanent,
non-partisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers, appointed by public and/or private officials who locate,
recruit, investigate, and evaluate the prospective candidates and propose them to the governor or other
appointing body (Berkson, 2007). This selection process takes place periodically. In some states the selected
judges have to be approved by election or by state legislation. The details, including the number of members
in selection committee, the type of people who can be a committee member, the selection method for the
members, the frequency of repetition, the retention method for existing judges, and the exact function of
the committee vary state by state3.
Merit selection, although closer to the appointive than to the election system, has been designed to
resolve the shortcomings of other selection methods. But, similar to any question about the advantages of
one selection method, the question of the superiority of a merit plan is an empirical question. The next
section reviews some of the main empirical studies on the differences among judicial selection methods.
2.2.2 Empirical Studies on Selection Methods
Selection methods for judges in the American states have changed frequently. The overall trend has been
from other selection methods toward a merit plan. In the birth of the nation, most states chose their judges
through appointment by legislatures or the governor. From the mid-nineteenth century, some states began
to use popular election. This change was a response to the fact that the upper class, especially property
owners, had closer connections with officials and used this connection to influence the results of the courts.
Within a short time, however, it became apparent that the popular elections did not result in independent
judiciaries. Judges, critics believed, were almost invariably selected by politicians and controlled by them.
From the early twentieth century, non-partisan elections were gradually introduced in the system. Once
again, criticism arose. The requirement of judicial candidates appearing on the ballot without a party label
did not change the dependency of judges to politicians. Finally, from the mid-twentieth century some states
began to switch to a merit plan (Hanssen, 2004).
Currently, most American states use merit plans to select their judges. In 2005, only six states chose
their highest court judges through appointment by governor or legislative body, five states used partisan
elections, sixteen states used non-partisan elections, and the remaining 25 states used merit plans (The Book
3For more details on variations of merit plan in different states see: The American Judicature Society, 2007.
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of the States, 2005). Appendix 1 describes the selection methods in the American States, the changes in the
selection methods, and some qualification notes from 1970 onward.
Several empirical studies have investigated the relative advantages and/or disadvantages of selection
methods. Most scholars argue that the reality of campaign financing explains several features of elective
systems. It affects the behavior of judges both in civil and criminal cases. The driving force is the tendency
of elected judges to perform in favor of potential voters and campaign money providers. For instance,
money raising requires candidates to accept campaign funding from trial lawyers, who are interested in
larger tort awards. As a result, the awards are higher in electoral states (Tabarrok and Helland, 1999).
Moreover, elected judges are more likely than appointed judges to vote in favor of in-state litigants and
against out-of-state defendants. These in-state litigants and their lawyers are valuable supporters of judges.
Pinello (1995) finds that appointed judges are more likely to favor criminal defendants than elected judges
are. This behavior can be interpreted as the desire of elected judges to respond to the public’s attitude
toward criminals. Judges in electoral systems are also more likely to rule in favor of employees than those in
non-electoral systems (Besley and Payne, 2006). This tendency to attract as many voters as possible causes
more discrimination claims in electoral systems. Hanssen (1999) argues that appointive systems are more
likely to provide independence for judges. This independence, though very valuable, boosts the uncertainty
in courts’ outcomes. Therefore, more litigation exists in non-electoral states. A few studies show that voters
are not as ignorant and uninformed as some studies claim. They show that the voters are able to gather
information about candidates and use them in casting votes (see Cann 2007 for references).
A number of researchers studied the effect of selection methods on the quality of judicial services.
Berkowitz and Clay (2006) defined quality using surveys of senior attorneys in wealthy companies. They
found that quality of state court correlated with nonpartisan judicial retention procedures. Cann (2007) used
a nationwide survey of state court judges to study the differences in the quality of courts in different selection
systems. He showed that the judges in elective systems rated their state court systems lower than judges
in states that used a merit selection or appointment system. Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2007) defined three
measures of judicial quality: productivity, measured by the total number of opinions; quality of opinions,
measured by out-of-state citation on opinions; and independence, measured by willingness of judges to write
opinions against judges of the same or opposite party. They found that elected judges were more productive,
while appointed judges wrote better opinions.
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2.2.3 Scope of the Study
The empirical literature on the effect of selection methods on judicial performance offers inconclusive re-
sults. The problem arises partly because of the wide disagreement among scholars on defining and measuring
judicial performance. Theories have proposed some indicators of a well-functioning judiciary, but most of
them are almost impossible to quantify. Moreover, lack of reliable data is a serious problem in almost any
empirical research on judicial performance. Lastly, most empirical studies use simple regression analysis,
cross section or pooled data, and a set of dummy variables (mostly just one dummy variable for elective
versus appointive systems) to capture the difference in selection methods. These empirical techniques fail to
capture some important aspects of the process. For instance, they cannot provide any information about the
evolution of judicial performance over time. Furthermore, regression analysis only reveals the average effect.
Many features of the relationship between selection methods and judicial performance is lost in averaging
process. Any improvement in theories, data, or empirical methods can provide a better understanding of
this relationship.
This study improves the existing literature in two directions: data and empirical method. I use
time series data sets for each state, which allows me to investigate the effect of selection model on judicial
performance over time. Specifically, it enables me to investigate whether there is a significant change in
variables of interest (i.e., measures of judicial performance) after a state switched from one selection method
to another. To achieve this goal, I use time-series models and apply hypothesis-testing methods. The most
important advantage of using time series models is that these models do not need control variables to explain
cross-state differences. Moreover, time-series data sets are suitable for answering the question of whether
the changes in selection methods caused a change in judicial performance. I use well-developed tests of
structural break to address this question.
The “selective litigation” hypothesis, introduced by Priest and Klein (1984) and applied by Hanssen
(1999), suggests that litigation rates will be higher where uncertainty is greater. Priest and Klein (1984)
show that if two parties have similar expectations about the courts’ outcome, i.e., if the uncertainty about
the results is low, they more likely keep the dispute out of the court. They only take the dispute to the
court if they evaluate the outcome differently, which occurs in a high uncertainty environment. Hanssen,
following this theory, suggests that the institutions that improve independence (appointive selection systems,
in particular) increase the uncertainty. On the one hand, dependency of judges binds the courts’ outcomes
to interests of particular groups, thus reduces the uncertainty of outcomes. On the other hand, independent
judges tend to stay in office longer; therefore, their preferences may be better known and their decisions
are more predictable. Whether independence increases or reduces the uncertainty is an empirical question.
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Hanssen follows the conventional wisdom that appointed judges are more independent than their elected
colleagues. He examines the rate of litigation in states’ highest court(s) and civil filing in states’ trial courts,
and finds more litigation in high courts of appointive states. The amount of civil litigation in trial courts
does not appear to differ significantly.
I apply structural change tests to investigate this theory. I use three data sets: total annual filing in the
state’s highest court (COLS), total annual filing in all high courts (COLR and IAC), and total annual civil
filings in the state’s trial courts of general jurisdiction (GJTC). These data sets are available for 1975-2005
and are suitable for structural break analysis.
Hanssen’s uncertainty theory examines litigants’ behavior. He argues that the selection method affects
this behavior, because judges in different states act differently. In other words, this theory links the behavior
of litigants to selection method through judges’ behavior. In the second part of this paper, I investigate the
impact of the selection method on judges’ behavior. To this end, I follow the theory presented by Choi,
Gulati and Posner (2007). They use the number of opinions in a state’s highest court as an indicator of
the productivity of justices. They argue that judges who are lazy and wish to avoid writing concurrences
and dissents, i.e., less productive judges, will write fewer opinions. Productivity is also, by some caveats,
a measure of quality because, all else equal, more opinions resolve a greater number of legal disputes, and
do so by more precision.4 I use the number of opinions per justice in the highest court of each state as a
measure of productivity. This variable is also available for 1975-2004, and I use it to investigate the effect
of change in selection methods on the productivity of courts.
2.3 Data
Information on the state courts’ structures is taken from different issues of The Book of States, 1970-
2005. The book provides information on selection methods for all state courts. It mentions the name
of each court, but not the type of the court. I combine information in the Book with definitions and
descriptions in State Court Caseload Statistics to define the selection methods in three types of courts:
Court of Last Resort (COLR), Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), and General Jurisdiction Trial Court
(GJTC). Limited Jurisdiction Trial Courts also operate in some states, but they are not considered in this
study due to their limited role and lack of enough data. The names of COLR, IAC, and GJTC differ state
by state. COLR in most states refers to the state supreme court, and IAC refers to the intermediate court
of appeal. Furthermore, two states, Oklahoma and Texas, have two courts of last resort. Some states have
4The authors correctly mention that there might be a trade off between quantity and quality of opinions. They use the
amount of citation as a measure of quality of opinions. Due to lack of long time series data on citation, I was unable to use
this measure.
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more than one court of appeal, and some states have none. I follow the definition in State Court Caseload
Statistics to determine the type of each court.
The Book of the States divides selection methods into the following categories: merit selection through
nominating commission, gubernatorial or legislative appointive system, non-partisan election, and partisan
election. The first two are considered as appointive systems, and the last are elective. The Book of the State
also distinguishes gubernatorial and legislative appointive systems. It enables me to distinguish five types
of selection methods.
There are two major movements in states selection methods since 1970. First, a movement from the
partisan election in favor of a non-partisan one. States tend to reduce the role of the political parties in
judicial elections. Second, and more importantly, movement toward adopting a merit plan. Most states have
switched from appointment (by governor or legislature) and election (partisan or non-partisan) to merit
plans.
I study the following changes in judicial selection process. All changes occurred between 1980 and
20005: (1) Connecticut: change from partisan election to merit plan in COLR, IAC, and GJTC, 1986;(2)
New Mexico: change from partisan election to merit plan in COLR, IAC, and GJTC, 1989; (3) Oklahoma:
change from non-partisan election to merit plan in IAC, 1987; (4) Rhode Island: change from appointment
by legislature to merit plan in COLR, 1994, and change from appointment by governor to merit plan in
GJTC, 1994; (5) Tennessee: change from partisan election to merit plan in COLR, 1994.
I also use the change in South Carolina’s system as an example of a change that can not be considered
as switching to a merit plan but has some aspects of that. Prior to 1996, judges in South Carolina have
selected by the legislature. In that year, the state established a Judicial Merit Selection Commission to
screen the judicial candidates and report to the General Assembly. Since 1997, the Assembly has been
restricted to voting on only those judicial candidates found qualified by the Commission. Due to the fact
that the Commission is closely connected to the appointing body, this system can not be considered as a
merit plan (see: The Book of the States, 2005, vol 37, p. 321, footnote (u).)
All the data sets were taken from the Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics (National
Center for State Courts, different years.) I use two series of data on litigation rates. The principal measure
of the amount of litigation is the total petition filed in state’s appellate courts, including both court(s) of
last resort (COLR) and intermediate appellate court(s) (IAC). This measure is equal to total mandatory
cases filed plus total discretionary petitions filed. Although the number of discretionary petitions granted
is a better measure than the number of filed discretionary petitions. Due to the lack of reliable, long-term
5Changes before 1980 and after 2000 are not suitable for structural change analysis.
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data on discretionary petitions, I use total filed cases instead.6 Data on the other measures of litigation,
such as the number of disposed petitions, is limited. I also use the amount of civil litigation in state General
Jurisdiction Trail Courts (GJTC). It is equal to total civil incoming cases in the State Courts Caseload
Statistics report.7.
The second data set is the number of opinions per judge in the court(s) of last resort. The source of
data is the Book of the States for different years. To calculate the numbers, I divided the total dispositions
by signed opinions by number of authorized justices/judges, both reported in State Court Caseload Statistics
annual report.8 This variable is a reliable measure of productivity of justices of supreme courts, and an
appropriate measure to examine the effect of selection methods on judges’ behavior.
2.4 Econometric Models
The classical test for structural change was introduced by Chow (1960). The test is designed to test the
null hypothesis of constant parameters against an alternative of a change in parameter at a single, known,
time. The simplest way to apply the test is to split the sample into two subsamples at the known date, to
estimate the parameters in each subsample, and to test the equality of two sets of parameters. Formally,
suppose the following dynamic model represents the data:
yt = α+ ρyt−1 + ǫt, E(ǫ
2
t ) = σ
2, t = 1, 2, ..., T (2.1)
where α and ρ and σ2 represent parameters. Suppose that the selection method changes in tn = π.T
where π ∈ (0, 1). A structural change can refer to a change in α, ρ, and σ2, individually or together. The
Chow test statistic is a classic Wald (or Likelihood Ratio or Lagrange Multiplier) statistic for the test of
the equality of parameter(s) in two subsamples: t = 1, 2, ..., π.T and t = π.T + 1, ..., T . I use this test to
answer the question of whether a switch in selection method in a known date resulted in a change in the
judicial performance. In linear models, the statistic becomes a simple F-statistic. I apply the Chow test
after controlling for the heteroscedasticity of error terms. The statistic is a Wald-type statistic.
The Chow test answers the question of whether a switch in selection method resulted in a change in
the parameters of the model. However, it fails to address some important issues. Consider, for instance,
a hypothetical scenario in which the change in the judicial performance lags or even leads the switch in
selection method. It might take time for the effects of the switch to appear. It is also possible that some
6For instance, the amount of litigation for 2004 was reported in Table 11 of: Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload
Statistics, 2005 (National Center for State Courts 2006)
7For instance, for 2004 the numbers were reported in Table 3 of the report
8For instance, for 2004 the numbers were reported in Table 17 of the report.
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agents change their behavior before the switch in selection method be implemented (through, for example,
an “announcement effect”). In both cases, a conventional Chow test fails to provide the proper answer. To
address this shortcoming, I use a test of structural break with unknown break data. Based on this test, I
answer the question of whether any structural change has occurred. If there is any evidence of a structural
break, the second question to answer is: what date is the best candidate for this change? Comparing this
estimated change date with real switch date reveals more information on the effect of switching in selection
method than a simple Chow test does.
Once the change date is considered as unknown, we need a new test to answer the question of the
existence of a break date, and a method to estimate this date. Several tests have been developed to examine
the existence of a structural change.9 One branch of tests are based on a functional of classic Wald statistic
for structural test for each possible break date.
The test that I use is sup-Wald test. The idea is to calculate a sequence of Wald statistics for testing
structural change in all years between two pre-specified times, TL and TH . A sup-Wald test is defined as
the supremum of all these Wald statistics. This method, proposed originally by Quant(1960), was not used
for a long time, because of the lack of a distributional theory. The classic distributional theory for the Chow
statistic is inappropriate for the sup-Wald statistic. Andrews (1993) showed the asymptotic properties of
sup-Wald statistic and reported the asymptotic critical values. Hansen (1997) suggested the approximation
for p-values associated with the statistic.
I use critical values provided by Andrews (1993) for the sup-Wald test statistic. If the sup-Wald statistic
exceeds the appropriate critical value, then I reject the null hypothesis of no structural break. Alternatively,
finding a sup-Wald statistic that does not exceed the critical value confirms the constancy of the parameters
in judicial behavior before and after the switch in selection method.10 Because of the limited number of
observations these critical values may not be appropriate. One solution to overcome this shortcoming is to
provide small-sample critical values using Monte Carlo simulations. I use Gaussian distribution to create
small sample critical values. All reported critical values are based on 10,000 repetition and represent 5%
significance level.
Finally, once the existence of a possible structural break is proved, one can estimate it. One potential
candidate for the break date is the year that provides the highest sup-Wald statistics. This estimator is valid
only when the Chow test is constructed with the “homoskedastic” form of the covariance matrix (Hansen,
2001). Hansen proposed a least-squares method that is suitable for this study. In this method, the sample
9See Perron, 2006 for a comprehensive survey of the existing literature on structural break
10This method has a very close counterpart in program evaluation literature. For a similar application of structural change
test as a program evaluation method see Cooper, et. al. (2001)
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is split at each possible break point (which is all years except the years close to starting and ending years);
the parameters in each side of break point are estimated,; and the sum of squared errors are computed. The
date that minimizes the full-sample summation of squared errors is the least squared estimator of break
date. I use both methods to estimate the break date.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Litigation Rates
Connecticut, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Oklahoma changed their judicial selection methods from election
to merit plans. Connecticut switched from partisan election to a merit plan in all court levels in 1986, and
New Mexico did so in 1989. Tennessee changed its selection method in the court of last resort in 1994. Judges
in its intermediate appellate court have been chosen through a merit plan since 1971. General jurisdiction
trial court judges are still chosen through partisan elections. Oklahoma changed the selection method for
intermediate appellate court judges from non-partisan election to a merit plan in 1987.
Hanssen (1999) argues that appointive systems are more independent, thus creating more uncertainty.
Uncertainty about the results in the courts increases the litigation rate. Uncertainty theory explains the
behavior of potential litigants. But it is essentially a theory about the judges’ behavior. Independent judges
act freely, thus creating more uncertain outcomes. This behavior changes litigants’ decisions. In this section
I examine the behavior of judges using the prediction of uncertainty theory. In the next section, I directly
examine their behavior using measures of productivity.
If uncertainty theory holds, one should expect a statistically significant increase in the litigation rate in
Connecticut, New Mexico, and Tennessee after switching from partisan election to the merit plan. Further-
more, one should expect an increase in litigation rate in the appellate court of Oklahoma. More importantly,
if the merit plan is indeed a version of appointive system (as is in literature), there should be no structural
change in states that switched from an appointive system to the merit plan. Rhode Island experienced such
a change in 1994 for all court levels. South Carolina experienced a change to a method that is not a merit
plan, but has some aspects of it. Prior to 1997, the judges were appointed by the legislature. In this year,
a commission was established to screen the quality of candidates before appointment.
Table 1 reports the amount of litigation per 100,000 population in the the court of last resort and all high
courts. It also shows the litigation rate in civil cases for New Mexico. The table reports the mean litigation
rates before and after switch to a merit plan, and t-statistic and p-value for a group mean comparison test.
These preliminary results are only partially consistent with Hanssen’s uncertainty theory. Similar to
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Hanssen’s results, the mean comparison in table 1 shows that the changes in selection methods affect the
litigation rates in high courts, but does not have a significant effect on litigation rates in the lower courts.
But unlike his results, Table 1 shows that the litigation rates in high courts change in different directions.
The litigation rates in the high courts of Connecticut, COLR of Tennessee, and IAC of Oklahoma increased
after switching to a merit plan. But the Connecticut supreme court and the high courts of New Mexico
experienced a significant decline in the litigation rates after switching to a merit plan.
Contrary to the prediction of the theory, the mean litigation rates in New Mexico dropped by about
10%. The Chow statistics repported in table 2 show a significant change in the structure of the process after
switching to a merit plan. The parameters of the model of the litgation rate for the supreme court and all
high courts of this state changed significantly.
The sup-Wald statistics, reported in Table 3, do not fully support the existence of any changes in New
Mexico litigation rates. For the COLR, the test statistic is higher than the asymptotic value (10.75), but
lower than the small sample critical values. The evidence of any change for the litigation rate in all high
courts is even weaker.
The last column of Table 3 reports the actual change dates and the estimated dates using two different
methods. Interestingly, the estimated dates for a potential change matches with the actual date of change.
In other words, the likelihood of a change in the litigation rate in this year (1989) is higher than in any other
year. Changing the selection method from a partisan election to a merit plan in New Mexico was associated
with an immediate, though moderate, response from the high courts. The response, though not a significant
regime change, was an almost 10% drop in litigation per 100,000 population.
The change in the litigation rates for Connecticut and Tennessee were the reverse. Due to missing
data for the Connecticut COLR, the results for this court are not reliable. Overall litigation rates in high
courts of this state show a significant increase. An increase also happened in the litigation rate of Tennessee
supreme court. The Chow tests show strong evidences of change in litigation rates in both states. These
changes occurred in intercept and slope parameters, alone and jointly.
Oklahoma experienced an increase in IAC litigation rate, though the evidence for a structural change
is not strong.
The results of sup-Wald test and Monte Carlo simulation confirm these findings. The sup-Wald statistic
for Connecticut is higher than the small sample critical value and much higher than the asymptotic value.
Moreover, both estimated change dates match with the actual year of change in the selection method. For
the litigation rates in Tennessee, the sup-Wald test statistic is much higher than the asymptotic critical
value, yet less than the small sample critical value for 5% test size. Furthermore, the estimated change
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dates, using both methods, result in a unique year that is differnet than the actual change date.
Tennessee switched the selection method to a merit plan in 1994 while the estimated change data,
assuming the date is unknown, is 1991. In other words, there was a change in the litigation rate in the
Tennessee COLR, but it was less likely to be caused by switching in the selection method. Another possible
scenario is the existence of multiple structural changes.
The same analysis holds for Oklahoma. There is strong evidence of structural change (sup-Wald statistic
is 174, which is much higher than small sample critical value, 69), but the estimated change dates do not
match with the actual date. Once again, one can conclude that a significant change has occurred in 1997,
which was obviously not caused by switching to a merit plan.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the mean litigation rates, the results of Chow tests for structural change, sup-
F test, small sample critical values, and the estimated change dates for Rhode Island and South Carolina.
Although litigation rates in Rhode Island increased after adopting the merit plan, the evidence for structural
break is weak. Moreover, the estimated change dates are different from the actual date. This observation is
consistent with Hanssens’s theory. A switch from an appointive system to a merit plan, which is basically
another appointive system, does not affect the uncertainty and litigation rates.
Almost all the evidence shows that South Carolina experienced a structural change in its litigation rate
in the same year that the switch in selection method occurred. This is not consistent with the uncertainty
theory. The change in selection method in this state is not a switch to a merit plan. Yet the change
is associated with a significant increase in litigation rate, and the hypothesis of no structural change is
rejected.
To summarize, there is evidence to claim that a switch in judicial selection method from the partisan
election to a merit plan has caused a significant change in judges’ behavior and has affected the litigation
rates. Yet the results are inconclusive. First, the estimated change dates for the states that switched from
the election to a merit plan is not perfectly matched with the actual date. Second, the direction of changes
varied in different states. The changes in selection methods in New Mexico were associated with a decline
in litigation rates, whereas in Connecticut, Tennessee and Oklahoma the litigation rates increased after
adopting a merit plan. Third, in states where one should not expect a change in the litigation rate, some
changes were evident.
Hanssen’s uncertainty theory explains how the behavior of potential litigants are effected by the change
in the selection methods. They change their behavior because of their expectation about the judges’ behavior.
In other words, the theory, although indirectly, aims to explain the behavior of judges. The litigation rates
increase after switching to merit plan, because judges behave differently. One can directly examine the judges’
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behavior. Choi, Gulati and Posner (2007) build their theory on the behavior of supreme court judges. They
use three variables to investigate the effect of selection methods on judges. In the next subsection, I answer
the question of whether adopting a merit plan has caused a structural change in one of these variables: the
productivity of high court judges.
2.5.2 Opinion
I follow Choi, Gulati and Posner (2007) in defining the number of opinions per justice in the court of
last resort as a measure of productivity. They argue that the judges in the elective systems are more
productive than those in appointive ones, because “ perhaps productivity is used by voters as a signal of
judicial competence, or by intermediaries, such as newspaper editorials, and parties.” Their results show
that “partisan-elected judges are the most productive, followed by merit plan and non-partisan judges.
Appointed judges ... are the least productive.” In other words, the theory argues that the supreme court
judges respond to election forces by working harder. They write more opinions to show off their capabilities.
I define opinion as total dispositions by signed opinions by number of authorized justices. I apply the
tests of structural change on opinions written in the courts of last resort in Connecticut, New Mexico,
Tennessee, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. Table 7 reports the mean opinions before and after switching
in the selection methods. The two last columns show the test statistics and p-values for simple mean
comparison tests.
The results, with one exception, are consistent with the theory. Judges in the elective systems wrote
more opinions. Switching from an elective system, where judges face the competition, to a merit plan, where
judges do not face such competition, caused a significant decrease in their productivity. The only exception
is Tennessee where the mean opinion per justice increased after switching to merit plan.
The Chow test statistics, reported in table 8, confirm the results. There were structural changes in
parameters of opinion model after switching to a merit plan. The Chow statistics for changes in both
parameters are significant in states where a change from an elective system to a merit plan occurred. The
change is evident at least at the 10% level. Sup-Wald tests and small sample critcal values, reported in table
9, provide mild support for the existence of a change. Althogh the estimated change dates, especially for
New Mexico, proposse the possibility of multiple changes.
The direction of change in opinion in Tennessee is opposite to that of the other two states. This can
be the result of the process of switching to the merit plan in this state. In Connecticut and New Mexico,
the switch from an elective to an appointive system occurred for all court levels, whereas in Tennessee the
switch occurred only in highest court. The judges in the other high courts were already selected through
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merit plans since 1970.
Table 7 also shows that the mean opinion in Rhode Island did not change after switching from the
appointive system to a merit plan. This result is consistent with the theory, as justices in neither system
face election. Table 8 and 9 confirm the results. There is no evidence of a structural break in this state.
In other words, the behavior of judges did not change after switching from an appointive system to a merit
plan.
Finally, similar to the results on litigation rates, the opinion written by justices in South Carolina
supreme court changed in 1997. This happened in spite of no major change in the selection method in
that state. The change in this state does not match with the existing theory and need more theoretical
explanations, as well as more empirical investigation.
2.6 Conclusion and Proposals for Further Research
The question of the impact of judicial institutions on the behavior of litigants, judges, and judicial perfor-
mance has been a long-lasting inquiry among scholars in legal studies. There has been a growing number
of empirical investigations on this issue. Yet the results are very inconclusive. New theories, data sets, and
empirical methods are needed.
In this paper, I revisited two existing theories in this area using a well-defined empirical method. Unlike
most papers in this area, which use simple regression methods to compare the characteristics of different
selection methods, I used structural change tests to investigate the impact of a switch in the selection method
on judicial behavior. I showed that the results of two seminal works in this area is not robust. Contrary to
the existing theory, I found that the litigation rates did not consistently increase after adopting the merit
plan. Furthermore, I found, with some exceptions, that judges in states that switched from an elective
system to a merit plan wrote more opinions.
The results should be considered with caution. They are not robust. Some results confirm the existing
theories and some contradict them. Improvements are possible is many directions. First, new sets of data will
facilitate more precise investigation. Specifically, longer data sets will improve the accuracy of the results.
Better data sets will also facilitate application of more sophisticated models. For instance, I estimated simple
autoregressive models, whereas more sophisticated models significantly improve the precision of the results.
Second, the details of each selection method vary in different states. For instance, the retention process
in a merit plan varies state by state. The details of selection methods might be crucial in shaping judicial
behavior. New theories are needed to address these details. Finally, investigating the judicial performance in
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states where there were no changes in selection methods might reveal important information about secular
trends in judicial behavior.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Mean litigation rates before and after the Change in Selection Methods
State Before After t-statistic P-Value
Connecticut
COLR Litigation Rate 18.10 11.70 3.4555 P (T ≥ t) = 0.0043
(1.62) (0.90)
COLR+IAC Litigation Rate 25.50 46.63 -5.1957 P (T ≤ t) = 0.0005
(3.90) (1.16)
New Mexico
COLR Litigation Rate 57.75 40.54 3.3290 P (T ≥ t) = 0.0024
(4.85) (1.78)
COLR+IAC Litigation Rate 102.06 92.54 1.5852 P (T ≥ t) = 0.0661
(5.48) (2.44)
GJTC Civil Litigation Rate 3310.14 3547.35 -1.0207 P (T ≤ t) = 0.1593
(89.16) (214.62)
Tennessee
COLR Litigation Rate 19.68 22.72 -4.3119 P (T ≤ t) = 0.0001
(0.41) (0.58)
Oklahoma
IAC Litigation Rate 18.41 27.35 -2.5258 P (T ≤ t) = 0.0087
(1.98) (2.94)
COLR: Court of Last Resort; IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court; GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court.
Litigation rate is the number of filed (=incoming) cases per 100,000 people.
Numbers in () are standard errors.
The Null Hypothesis is: mean(before)-mean(after)=0; alternatives are shown in the last column.
In finding degrees of freedom I assume the standard deviations are not equal in the two groups.
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Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters and Chow Statistics for Litigation Rate Equation
State α ρ α and ρ
Connecticut
COLR Litigation Rate
Before 9.49 0.56
(5.67) (0.30)
After 5.44 0.55
(2.17) (0.17)
Chow Statistics 8.60 7.37 4.19
(0.0082) (0.0133) (0.0312)
COLR+IAC Litigation Rate
Before 14.85 0.38
(4.74) (0.14)
After 19.80 0.58
(4.81) (0.11)
Chow Statistics 26.12 147.60 50.20
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
New Mexico
COLR Litigation Rate
Before 2.66 1.01
(10.47) (0.22)
After 25.93 0.33
(0.12) (0.12)
Chow Statistics 5.71 9.17 7.34
(0.0251) (0.0058) (0.0034)
COLR+IAC Litigation Rate
Before -6.50 1.09
(21.32) (0.22)
After 41.48 0.53
(15.64) (0.17)
Chow Statistics 3.28 4.05 3.54
(0.0828) (0.0556) (0.0458)
GJTC Civil Litigation Rate
Before 1462 0.59
(482) (0.14)
After 2166 0.38
(941) (0.26)
Chow Statistics 0.01 0.00 0.24
(0.9162) (0.9507) (0.7920)
Tennessee
COLR Litigation Rate
Before 15.17 0.21
(2.71) (0.13)
After 9.42 0.59
(7.24) (0.33)
Chow Statistics 15.83 17.86 9.83
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Oklahoma
IAC Litigation Rate
Before 10.12 0.49
(5.09) (0.35)
After 1.67 0.91
(1.26) (0.07)
Chow Statistics 0.20 0.02 1.82
(0.6575) (0.8949) (0.1862)
COLR: Court of Last Resort; IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court; GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court.
Numbers in () for estimated α and ρ are robust standard deviation.
Numbers in () for Chow statistics are the p-values associated with the statistics.
Null Hypothesis is NO structural break.
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Table 2.3: Sup-Wald Test for the Existence of Change in Litigation Rate
State Sup-Wald Statistic Small Sample CV Year*
Connecticut
COLR Litigation Rate 10.17 74 1986/1995/1992
COLR+IAC Litigation Rate 119.5 85 1986/1986/1986
New Mexico
COLR Litigation Rate 17.23 47 1989/1989/1989
COLR+IAC Litigation Rate 8.30 53 1989/1989/1989
GJTC Civil Litigation Rate 12.3 37 1989/1997/1993
Tennessee
COLR Litigation Rate 29.38 42 1994/1991/1991
Oklahoma
IAC Litigation Rate 174 69 1987/1997/1997
COLR: Court of Last Resort; IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court; GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court.
Null Hypothesis is NO structural break.
Asymptotic CV is 10.75 (Andrews, 1993).
*: The numbers are the actual change date, the estimated year using sup-Wald, and the estimated year using LS.
Table 2.4: Mean litigation rate before and after the Change in Selection Methods
State Before After t-statistic P-Value
Rhode Island
COLR Litigation Rate 58.53 60.82 -0.4743 P (T ≤ t) = 0.3201
(2.58) (4.09)
GJTC Civil Litigation Rate 850.65 894.61 -1.1085 P (T ≤ t) = 0.1401
(37.04) (14.12)
South Carolina
COLR Litigation Rate 17.30 35.99 -3.4206 P (T ≤ t) = 0.0030
(1.40) (5.28)
COLR: Court of Last Resort; IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court; GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court.
Litigation rate is the number of filed (=incoming) cases per 100,000 people.
Numbers in () are standard errors.
The Null Hypothesis is: mean(before)-mean(after)=0; alternatives are shown in the last column.
In finding degrees of freedom I assume the standard deviations are not equal in two groups.
Table 2.5: Estimated parameters and Chow Statistics for Litigation Rate Equation
State α ρ α and ρ
Rhode Island
COLR Litigation Rate
Before 15.58 0.77
(9.07) (0.17)
After .24 0.94
(10.39) (0.14)
Chow Statistics 2.14 1.75 1.46
(0.1567) (0.1977) (0.2540)
GJTC Civil Litigation Rate
Before 111.1 0.89
(121.4) (0.17)
After 647.3 0.27
(262.2) (0.28)
Chow Statistics 0.20 0.29 1.90
(0.6591) (0.5949) (0.1880)
South Carolina
COLR Litigation Rate
Before 2.34 0.92
(3.11) (0.19)
After 31.56 0.13
(12.48) (0.24)
Chow Statistics 3.21 1.76 3.51
(0.0856) (0.1972) (0.0466)
COLR: Court of Last Resort; IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court; GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court.
Numbers in () for estimated α and ρ are robust standard deviation.
Numbers in () for Chow statistics are the p-values associated with statistics.
Null Hypothesis is NO structural break.
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Table 2.6: Sup-Wald Test for the Existence of Change in Litigation Rate
State Sup-Wald Statistic Small Sample CV Year*
Rhode Island
COLR Litigation Rate 9.9 47 1994/1986/1996
GJTC Civil Litigation Rate 41.5 61 1994/1985/1992
South Carolina
COLR Litigation Rate 14.1 34.5 1997/1997/1997
COLR: Court of Last Resort; IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court; GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court.
Null Hypothesis is NO structural break.
Asymptotic CV is 10.75 (Andrews, 1993).
*: The numbers are the actual change date, the estimated year using sup-F, and the estimated year using LS.
Table 2.7: Opinion per justice in COLS before and after the Change in Selection Methods
State Before After t-statistic P-Value
Connecticut
Opinions per Justice 37.00 27.76 2.7106 P (T ≥ t) = 0.0136
(3.13) (1.36)
New Mexico
Opinions per Justice 39.13 17.98 7.0478 P (T ≥ t) = 0.00002
(1.41) (2.65)
Tennessee
Opinions per Justice 41.05 60.69 -1.9474 P (T ≤ t) = 0.0336
(2.31) (4.38)
Rhode Island
Opinions per Justice 30.00 27.92 0.4445 P (T ≥ t) = 0.3317
(1.52) (4.44)
South Carolina
Opinions per Justice 62.54 37.60 2.9793 P (T ≥ t) = 0.0038
(8.12) (2.04)
COLR: Court of Last Resort.
Numbers in () are standard errors.
The Null Hypothesis is: mean(before)-mean(after)=0; alternatives are shown in the last column.
In finding the degrees of freedom I assume that the standard deviations of two groups are not equal.
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Table 2.8: Estimated parameters and Chow Statistics for Opinion Equation
State α ρ α and ρ
Connecticut
COLR Opinions per Justice
Before -6.68 1.35
(21.71) (0.67)
After 5.78 0.77
(6.41) (0.22)
Chow Statistics 5.03 5.23 2.70
(0.0359) (0.0327) (0.0919)
New Mexico
COLR Opinions per Justice
Before 35.71 0.08
(15.96) (0.41)
After 1.96 0.80
(1.42) (0.08)
Chow Statistics 6.49 4.0 4.56
(0.0180) (0.0575) (0.0221)
Tennessee
COLR Opinions per Justice
Before 20.97 0.44
(5.74) (0.14)
After 39.75 0.21
(14.78) (0.35)
Chow Statistics 5.13 3.51 3.03
(0.0337) (0.0744) (0.0697)
Rhode Island
COLR Opinions per Justice
Before 22.68 0.21
(16.85) (0.51)
After 6.25 0.77
(3.70) (0.16)
Chow Statistics 0.05 0.21 0.64
(0.8295) (0.7332) (0.5402)
South Carolina
COLR Opinions per Justice
Before 42.11 0.35
(19.30) (0.37)
After 38.92 -0.03
(3.01) (0.04)
Chow Statistics 6.41 8.39 4.29
(0.0186) (0.0081) (0.0267)
COLR: Court of Last Resort.
Numbers in () for estimated α and ρ are robust standard deviation.
Numbers in () for Chow statistics are the p-values associated with statistics.
Null Hypothesis is NO structural break.
Table 2.9: Sup-Wald Test for the Existence of Change in Opinion
State Sup-Wald Statistic Small Sample CV Year*
Connecticut
COLR Opinions per Justice 48 208 1986/1985/1985
New Mexico
COLR Opinions per Justice 80 75 1989/1996/1992
Tennessee
COLR Opinions per Justice 12.1 52 1994/1992/1992
Rhode Island
COLR Opinions per Justice 537 11000 1994/1985/1991
South Carolina
COLR Opinions per Justice 37 35 1997/1987/1987
COLR: Court of Last Resort.
Null Hypothesis is NO structural break.
Asymptotic CV is 10.75 (Andrews, 1993).
*: The numbers are the actual change date, the estimated year using sup-F, and the estimated year using LS.
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Chapter 3
The Federal Public Defender System
3.1 Introduction
The sixth amendment of the United States’ Constitution guarantees the defendants’ right of being repre-
sented by attorneys in the federal criminal prosecutions. Today, this “right to counsel” clause is interpreted
as the constitutional right of criminal defendants to have the assistance of professional attorneys, even if
they can not afford to hire a lawyer. But it took a long time for these rights to be fully realized. It was
only during 1960’s and 1970’s that this clause was interpreted as requiring the state to provide counsel for
indigent defendants -the defendants who are unable to afford private counsel. In 1964, the Criminal Justice
Act (CJA) was enacted to guarantee the appointment of lawyers for indigent defendants in federal criminal
cases. Gradually, these rights were expanded to defendants in state courts. In recent years, the majority of
federal criminal cases have been represented by publicly financed lawyers. In 2005, more than seventy per-
cent of federal criminal cases were terminated using publicly financed counsel. About half of defendants were
assisted by public defender organizations, and the other half were represented by court-appointed private
lawyers, called panel attorneys.1
Many studies have examined the performance of publicly financed attorneys. Yet, the question of the
performance of these defenders versus private lawyers has remained an unanswered question.2 On the one
hand, the conventional wisdom acknowledges that private lawyers outperform publicly financed attorneys.
Publicly financed attorneys, especially public defenders, they argue, have less chance of having a case dropped
compared with private lawyers, plead guilty more often, proceed to trial less often, and if so, their conviction
rates are higher (see, for instance, Champion, 1989).
On the other hand, none of the studies was able to demonstrate a clear advantage of private lawyers
over public defenders. (Hansen et. al. 1992). The evidence in favor of private lawyers’ performance either
1Unless otherwise indicated, all the numbers and statistics were calculated from the records compiled by the Federal Judicial
Center, the research and education agency of the federal judicial system. The data are made available through the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), located in Ann Arbor Michigan. See ICPSR front page,
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu The data set is found in Study Number 4382, Data Set DS5, Criminal Cases 2005.
2see Feeney and Jackson (1991) for a comprehensive comparison of empirical studies.
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was mixed or had serious technical shortcomings. For instance, only a few studies paid attention to the
possibility that defendants self-select themselves to be represented by private counsels- or the selection
mechanism imposes a bias on the outcome of criminal cases. Furthermore, many of them examined the
effect of counsel type on only one measure of cases’ outcome, for instance, guilty plea rates. This approach
ignores the possibility that lawyers trade-off different types of court outcome.
More importantly, none of the existing studies have considered the interaction between players in de-
fense process. Defenders, their clients, and prosecutors strategically play this game. A well-known problem,
asymmetric information between defenders and prosecutors and between defenders and their clients, deter-
mine the results of this game. Factors such as complication of the case, defendants knowledge about his
rights -and thus, his/her monitoring power over his agent,- the workload of the defendant, the wage and
salary structure are among the main factors that changes the extent of this problem.
In this paper, I examine the impact of counsel type on the outcome of federal criminal cases. I find that
in a study of all crimes, although publicly financed defenders, especially public defenders, finish their cases
faster than their private colleagues, they do not achieve a different outcomes in terms of guilty plea rates
and sentence time. Once I creak the observations to different categories of offenses, the difference in outcome
appears. In simple cases, such as immigration-related offenses, public defenders have the advantage in terms
of time and sentence length, probably through building a mutually-beneficial relationship with prosecutors.
Complications in criminal cases, such as fraud cases, make it harder for them to achieve better outcome
than their private colleagues. A well-trained, experienced, and motivated private lawyer is willing to spend
more time on these cases to achieve better results. A overburden public defender lose her advantage to her
private colleagues.
3.2 Theory and Literature
Since the 1960’s, all defendants in federal criminal cases have had the constitutional right to have the
assistance of counsel for their defense. Federal and state governments are required to provide counsel for
indigent defendants, defendants who can not afford a private lawyer. Two types of programs are available
for defendants in federal criminal cases: (1) panel attorneys: private attorneys appointed by the court on a
case-by-case basis, and (2) attorneys from federal defender offices: offices funded by the federal government
and staffed with government employees. These two programs, along with private lawyers, provide counsel
service for all indigent defendants in federal criminal cases.
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Immediately after establishing the public defender system, the question of the performance of these
defenders compared with private lawyers attracted the attention of scholars and officials. The Department
of Justice reported no significant difference between the performance of public and private defenders. Stud-
ies made or supported by the Department of Justice have found no significant effect of type-of-attorney
on conviction rate. Moreover, although incarceration was more likely for defendants who used the public
defender service, these defendants had shorter average sentences than defendants with private lawyers (Har-
low, 2000). Hanson and his coauthors (1992) did not find any significant difference in any aspect of the
outcome, including conviction rates, charge-reduction rates, incarceration rates, and the length of sentence
time. They argued that publicly financed defense system achieved this outcome “without sacrificing the
interests of defendants.” They attributed the success of these defenders to “the presence of experienced
counsel among public defenders, assigned counsel, and contract attorneys.”
Not many researchers agree with the above statements. Several studies found supportive evidence for
shortcomings of the public defense system. Most of the shortcomings of public defender organizations have
been linked to the lack of sufficient resources. The argument is that public defender offices have to manage
a huge caseload with very limited resources (Stunz, 1997; Champion, 1989). As a result, public defenders
spend less effort and time than would private lawyers.
A few studies go beyond a simple explanation of lack of money and strive to build a theory based on the
behavior of defendants and prosecutors. Champion (1989) pointed to a list of disparities between defendants
of different socioeconomic backgrounds, and concluded that prosecutors, being aware of such disparities, use
them to their advantage.
Stuntz (1997) expanded the problem to the whole criminal justice system: “overregulation of the
criminal process, proceduralization of criminal litigation at the expense of the merits, overcriminalization,
and underfunding of criminal defense.” As a result, he argued, the cost of prosecuting defendants has
substantially increased over the last three decades. Public defenders respond to this by “acting differently”
than privately retained counsel. Defendants who can afford the high cost of litigation file more pretrial
motions and take the litigation to a higher level if the stakes are worthwhile. For defendants with limited
resources, filing motions might not be an option. In other words, Stuntz claimed that “indigent defendants
do not litigate enough.”
Another explanation for the difference between the public and private defenders’ performance is that
public defenders are in fact government officials whose goals are not necessarily good defense (Feeney and
Jackson, 1991). Some scholars also questioned the quality of public defenders on the basis that they lack
sufficient legal skills. Champion (1989) argued that public defenders are usually new attorneys with little or
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no trial experience and low skill in analyzing evidence.
Defendants who can not afford private lawyers may be represented by public defenders or court-
appointed private lawyers. Only a few studies paid attention to the distinction of these two types of counsel.
Cohen, Semple, and Crew (1983) found that “public defender-based systems do cost less per case than their
assigned counsel counterparts.” They reported higher guilty plea rates, more dismissals, higher conviction
rates, and longer time of proceeding through the process, but no differences in the severity of the sentence.
Iyengar (2002) found significant results in favor of public defenders. In a careful study using a combination
of data on cases and on characteristics of defenders, she found that lack of experience among panel attorneys
should be blamed for their poor performance.
Almost all of the existing studies strive to confirm the absolute advantage, or lack of it, for one
type of defender. They examine the effect of variables such as money, work load, and experience. Most
of these studies fail to elaborate on the effect of these variables on interaction among defenders, clients,
and prosecutors. A more clarifying theory should consider these interactions. More specifically, the theory
should recognize a well-known problem in these interactions: asymmetric information problem.
Whenever an agent (defender) is hired to represent a principal (defendant), a principle-agent problem
may occur, because the parties may not have the same interest and they do not have the same information.
For instance, a public defender who has several cases to handle, may strategically accept a deal in a plea
bargain with the prosecutor just to terminate the case and save time for other cases. Or, inversely, she may
take a case to court to show the prosecutor that she is willing to play tough, and thus, receive better deals in
other cases. In these cases, the defender has considerations that do not fit precisely into her client’s interest.
The limited information and lack of sufficient monitoring power of the defendant makes him vulnerable to
this strategic behavior.
Asymmetric information exists also between defenders and prosecutors. Defenders have access to some
information, provided by their clients, that prosecutors do not. A defender might accept a light deal and
avoid revealing information that is not in favor of her client.
The intensity of asymmetric information is affected by several factors. For instance, when clear evidence
exists and the expected punishment is low, or when the client is aware of his/her rights, there is little place
for a defender to play a game with her client or prosecutor. But in complicated cases, the intensity of
asymmetric information among players rises, and the results depend on the players’ skills. In other words,
the performance of defenders depends on the factors that affect the intensity of asymmetric information
problem. Expected punishment, complexity of the case, defendant,s knowledge, defenders’ ability, and the
structure of payment are among these factors.
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Building a formal model to explain the impact of these factors is beyond the scope of this study.
In this paper, I argue that a combination of these factors, in a theory based on asymmetric information
among players, determines whether defendants achieve better outcomes with one kind of attorney. Since
this combination is different in each case, the theory predicts that each kind of defenders has advantage in
some cases. More specifically, if the case is simple and frequent, public defenders may have the advantage of
building a work relationship with prosecutors that results in the fast and efficient termination of cases. But
if the case is complicated, they may lose their advantage. In the next section, I first investigate the average
impact of counsel type on the outcome of cases, and then, I test the validity of the above theory.
3.3 Data
I used data on federal criminal cases in 2005. The data originate from the district court offices throughout
the United States. They provide case level information on all criminal cases in district courts in both
filing and termination stages. Each record in the dataset presents the information of one defendant. Some
defendants were charged in more than one case3 I limit the study to the first offense of each defendant, which
is the most serious offense.
During the fiscal year 2005, 162,558 cases were open in the 94 U.S. district Courts.4 Among them,
77314 cases terminated and the rest remained open for final resolution in coming years.
Three types of counsel were distinguished in both filing and termination stages: retained lawyers (or
private lawyers), Criminal Justice Act (CJA) attorneys (appointed lawyers), and public defenders. Cases
with unknown counsel type were categorized as “others.”5. The performance of these three types of counsel
differs in many aspects. Table 3.1 presents the time spent on each case, the guilty plea rates, the conviction
rates in trial courts, the mean sentencing time, and the percentage of cases represented by each counsel
type at the termination stage. The time refers to the number of days from proceeding stage to disposition
3About half of the defendants were charged with at least two counts in filing and termination stages.
4The total number of cases in this year was 183284, among them 20726 cases were filed as misdemeanor or petty. I dropped
these cases and restricted the analysis to felony cases.
5About 2.5% of cases were terminated without reporting the counsel type. In about half of the cases, the counsel type was
not reported in filing; due to the fact that the counsel is usually assigned only during defendant’s “first appearance” before a
judge or magistrate (Burnham, 2002)
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satge.6 The sentencing time is the number of months of imprisonmnet.7 More than 70% of defendants were
represented by one type of publicly financed attorneys.
As the exiting literature has indicated, private lawyers, on average, spend more time on each case. It
takes about eight months for private attorneys to finish a typical case, whereas, public defenders finish their
cases in less than five months. Figure 3.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the time from proceeding
to disposition. It demonstrates that private defenders (tcounsel=3) finish a case noticeably faster than
appointed lawyers (tconsel=2) and private lawyers. This difference is especially visible for simple cases. The
survival function of public lawyers separate from that of private lawyers and panel attorneys in very early
stage. In other words, the main difference among these attorneys belongs to simple cases that do not require
a long time to resolve.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 present the outcome. Publicly financed attorneys, especially public defenders,
plead guilty more often, but the difference is relatively small (about 2 percent). Public defenders also achieve
better outcomes in terms of sentence time when they plead guilty. They receive about 39 months impris-
onment, which is lower than the punishment for the clients of private judges (48 months) and significantly
lower than the clients of court-appointed lawyers (53 months.)
Public defenders are less likely to take a case to trial, but if they do so, contrary to the conventional
wisdom, they achieve a better outcome. Their conviction rate (83.6 percent) is lower than both private
lawyers (85.4 percent) and appointed lawyers (90.5 percent). Moreover, the average sentence time for public
defenders who proceed to trial (104 months) is just slightly above the sentence time achieved by private
lawyers (98 months) and considerably lower than that of appointed lawyers (145 months.)
These preliminary results are mostly inconsistent with the literature. The widely acknowledged claim
is that publicly financed attorneys rush into guilty plea and achieve worse outcome than their private
colleagues. The claim argues that the lack of enough resources forces the attorneys to skip some stages in
the investigation process and jump to the conclusion (Stunz, 1997). This explanation, to be valid, requires
higher guilty plea rates and worse sentence times and conviction rates for public and appointed lawyers.
The results in Table 3.1 do not support this theory. Public lawyers seem to perform well in many aspects.
6Five dates were recorded for each case: filing, first appearance, proceeding, disposition, and sentencing. Moreover, the
records contain three time intervals: from earlier of filing and first appearance to proceeding; from proceeding to disposition,
and from disposition to sentencing. Surprisingly, these dates do not adequatly match with the reported dates. I re-calculated the
time intervals using the reported dates. The time intervals represent the number of days between reported date of proceeding
to the reported date of disposition. The cookbook for the data set defines each date as followes: proceeding date is “[t]he date
upon which proceeding in a case commenced on charges pending in the U.S. district court where the defendant appeared. The
proceeding date may also be the date of the defendants’ felony-waiver”; and disposition date “indicates the end of the judicial
proceedings before the court.” (see Federal Judicial Center, (2006). I thank Andrew Leipold for clearing the meaning of these
dates and many other concepts in federal criminal cases.) These two dates are the same for about ten percent of the cases,
which create zero intervals. I replaced these time intevals with one day, for survival analysis.
7A smal protion of cases ended with punishments such as monetary fines, supervised releases, and probations. I did not
consider these punishments due to their relatively samll likelihood of occurance.
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Moreover, appointed lawyers seem to provide a surprisingly low-quality service.
The results in Table 3.1 need more elaboration to be valid. The first issue is the selection bias problem.
If the defendants, identified by the severity and complexity of their charges, as well as other factors that affect
the outcome of courts, are not randomly assigned among counsel types, the results in Table 3.1 are subject
to selection bias. For instance, if defendants who are charged with simple charges usually are represented
by public defenders, then their high plea rates and low sentencing time is simply the result of charge type,
not the counsel’s performance. I address this problem in the next sections. The question is whether after
removing possible selection biases, there still are significant differences in the performance of different types
of counsel.
3.4 Econometric Models and Empirical Results
3.4.1 Processing Time
As Table 3.1 indicates, publicly financed defenders manage to finish their defenses at a faster pace than
do their private colleagues. On the one hand, the existing literature relates this to the fact that they are
overloaded and strive to finish their cases as fast as possible. On the other hand, this difference in time
performance might be the result of the type of the charges their clients face. Controlling for a variety of
explanatory variables resolves this issue. If, after controlling for different variables, the effect of counsel type
remains significant, one might conclude that counsel type indeed matters for the outcome. In this section, I
use a survival analysis to investigate the impact of counsel type on time.
I use the Cox proportional hazard regression model, a semiparametric model. This model has the
advantage of not using any specific baseline survival function. At the same time, this model allows for the
effect of the covariates to be parameterized to alter the baseline function. In other words, it assumes that
all hazard functions (i.e., hazard functions for different counsel types) have similar shapes, and the only
difference is the shift in these functions. Technically, the Cox proportional hazard model asserts that the
hazard rate (which, in the subject of this paper, is the limiting probability of finishing the case at the end
of a time interval, conditioning upon the case surviving to the beginning of that interval) for case i is:
h(t|xi, di) = h0(t)exp(xiβ + α.di), i = 1, 2, ..., N (3.1)
where di represents the counsel type, and xi is the vector of covariates. h0(t) captures the effect of
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baseline hazard (for xi = 0 and di = 0).
The Cox model does not specify any functional form for this baseline hazard function. It can be left
unestimated. This does not effect the validity of estimation as long as baseline functions have the same
shape for all possible hazard functions.8 Using this model one might compare the hazard rates of two cases,
i and j, with different counsel types and covariates:
h(t|xi, di)
h(t|xj , dj)
=
exp(xiβ + α.di)
exp(xjβ + α.dj)
(3.2)
This equation clarifies the interpretation of the coefficient of the counsel type variable (α). Suppose
that a private lawyer is chosen as the comparison group (dj = 0). If case i is represented by a public defender
(dj = 1), then the above ratio, ceteris paribus, is exp(α).
All the control variables of the analysis are categorical data. The most important among them, is the
set of offense type. I use the Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP) detailed offense classification. This
classification consists of about 45 offense types. The second set of control variables is the location variables.
I use district codes to control for the location. Although no theory present the geographic effect of crime on
judicial outcome, the regional characteristics might affect the outcome. For instance, crime rates in some
districts are lower than in others. The work load of the public defenders might be lower in these districts.
Controlling for geographical characteristics of cases removes these effects. I use district codes (94 districts) in
fixed-effects models for this purpose. I also control for the number of charges a defendant faces. The existing
records of the data allow for up to five charges against any defendant. The number of charges increases the
complexity of the case and affects the time as well as the outcome of the process.
Table 3.2 presents the effect of counsel type on processing time at the filing stage. At this stage, some of
the cases are still open. The estimation is based on right-censored data. The reference group for this analysis
is the cases for which a counsel has not been assigned. At the filing stage, this group include about half of
the observations. The first part of the table present the Hazard Ratios relative to the reference group along
with robust standard errors. The second part contains the Hazard Ratios based on counsel type. Because
the model is the proportional hazard model, these numbers can easily be achieved by dividing the hazard
ratios of the first part of the table. The test below each number presents the result of the Chi-Square for a
Wald Test of unity of hazard ratios for different counsel types (or, equivalently, equality of hazard ratios in
the first part of the table.)
The first column shows the estimate of a Cox Model using only counsel type at the filing stage as
8A nonparametric estimation of hazard functions for different counsel types, not reported here, shows that this condition
holds.
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an explanatory variable. The results confirm the primary finding that public defenders spend less time
compared with panel attorneys and private lawyers. The rate at which the cases reach a conclusion is high
for public defenders and low for private lawyers. The rate of finishing a case for a public defender is, on
average, about 1.77 times that of a private lawyer. The rate for panel attorneys relative to private lawyers
is lower, about 1.22, but is still more than one, indicating that panel attorneys work at a faster pace than
private lawyers.
As indicated in the literature, the socio-economic characteristics of defendants, and as a result, the
types of defenders chosen by them, varies by offense type. For instance, only about 5 percent of defendants
charged with Immigration Felonies -illegal entry and illegal reentry- were represented by private lawyers. A
majority of these defendants, about 65 percent, were represented by public defenders. In contrast, defendants
charged with Fraud were most likely to be represented by private lawyers. More than 40 percent of them
were represented by private lawyers, compared with about 20 percent being represented by public defenders.
This correlation between counsel type and offense types imposes a selection bias. The first step to eliminate
these biases is to control for offense types. I use a fixed-effects model to control for offense types.9
The second and third columns of Table 3.2 present the results of fixed-effects estimation. The hazard
ratio of the public defender group to the private lawyer group falls from 1.77 to 1.33 after controlling for
offense type and to 1.31 after adding the codes of federal districts and the variable indicating the existence
of multiple charges. The change in the hazard ratio of he panel attorneys to the private lawyers falls to 1.11
after controlling for the above variables.
The 2005 data used to estimate the results in Table 3.2 contains all the federal felony cases at the filing
stage. They include all closed cases as well as cases that were not closed at the end of the period. Some
characteristics of federal cases change from the filing stage to the termination stage. The most important
one is the changes in lawyer type. About half of defendants had not chosen any lawyer by the filing stage.
This “not-reported” group shrank to less than three percent by the termination stage. To consider these
changes, I reestimate in Table 3.3, the above model using the data at the termination stage. I also drop the
small proportion of cases with unknown counsel type. This reduces the number of counsel type variables to
two dummy variables representing panel attorneys and public defenders and leaves private lawyers as the
base reference group. As a result, each coefficient in the first part of Table 3.3 presets the hazard ratio of
the group with respect to private lawyers. Accordingly, the tests in the second part reduce to a simple test
of unity of coefficients. The hazard ratio for the cases represented by public defenders is 1.23 times greater
than that of private lawyers, and this number is significantly different from one. In other words, all the
9Although this method can not fully eliminate the bias, it can considerably reduce it. More advanced methods of eliminating
bias need information on characteristics of criminals and defenders, which is not available in the dataset.
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evidence supports the idea that public lawyers spend less time on their cases. This finding is true, to a less
extent, for panel attorneys. Although these defenders spend less time on their cases than private lawyers,
the difference is much less than that of public defenders.
These findings raise a host of further questions. Does the behavior of publicly financed attorneys in
spending less time on each case affect the outcomes? Do the results of cases represented by them harm their
clients? In other words, do these defenders, as some scholars have suggested, sacrifice the outcomes of their
cases in favor of time? If the answer to the last question is positive, one should find worse outcomes in cases
represented by public (and panel) defenders. To address these questions, I investigate the impact of counsel
type on two measures of outcome: guilty plea, and sentence length.
3.4.2 Guilty Plea and Sentence
Table 3.4 shows the result of models that focus on the outcomes of federal criminal cases by different
counsel type. The first column presents the results of a simple logit model on a guilty plea. Models (2)-(5)
show the analysis of the final outcome of a case, the sentence length -measured by the number of months of
imprisonment. I control for federal district and crime type effects.
The analysis of outcomes starts with an OLS estimation.10 Since the data are count data, a Poisson
model fits better to them. In a Poisson model, the probability of a non-negative integer number for the
variable of interest (sentence length) is given by a Poisson distribution:
Pr(Y = y) =
e−µµy
y!
, y = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.3)
where µ is the intensity or rate parameter. The standard method of parametrization of the model is to
include the explanatory variables in intensity parameter: µ = exp(X
′
β).
In this study, like most studies of count data, the main problem with using a Poisson model is the
problem of over-dispersion.11 To solve this problem, I estimated the Negative Binomial model with a
quadratic variance (NB2): var(y/µ, α) = µ(1 + αµ), where α measures the extent of over-dispersion. I also
extend the analysis to an NB2 model with inflated zeros to consider the fact that many cases were terminated
with zero sentence length12
10Since the dependent variable is a discrete variable, the values are positive, and there is a considerable number of zeros in
data (the distribution is zero-inflated), this model is not the best model. But due to the large number of observations, the
results are reliable.
11Over-dispersion occurs due to the fact that the Poisson distribution contains only one parameter and assumes that the
average and variance are equal to that single parameter. In most count data analysis, this equality does not hold. I followed
the method suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) to test for over-dispersion. This test is based on an auxiliary regression
of a generated dependent variable ((y − µˆ)2 − y)/µˆ on µˆ without an intercept term and performing a t-test of whether the
coefficient of µˆ is zero. The test, not reported here, strongly supports the existence of over-dispersion.
12Because of the lack of enough variables to predict the zeros and sentence length, the results of NB2 model with inflated
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Model (1) in Table 3.4 presents the results of a logit model. The dependent variable is whether the
case was terminated by guilty plea. Similar to previous analysis, the main explanatory variables of interest
are dummy variables for two type of lawyers, public defendants and panel attorneys. The control variables
include offense type, district, and existence of more than one charge. The table shows the coefficient, as well
as the marginal effect (ME).
Public defenders, on average, plead guilty more often than their private colleagues. The coefficient
is positive and statistically significant. The marginal effect shows that the probability of pleading guilty
increases by 1.26 percentage point, if the case is represented by public defender. Although, this effect is
not high, combined with the previous analysis of processing time, provides slight support to the theory that
public defenders rush into pleading guilty. Of course, it does not mean that their performance is necessarily
worse than that of private lawyers. To complete the picture, one should also study the final outcome of a
case.
The last four columns of Table 3.4 present the results of models on sentence length. Interestingly
enough, the results show that after controlling for all control variables, public defenders achieve better
outcomes in terms of sentence length. The results of an OLS estimation and the results of Poisson model are
very similar. These results confirm that public defenders receive the same or even lower sentence for their
clients compared with private lawyers. Although the difference is not considerable, the negative sign appears
in all Poisson models. This finding confirms that public defenders’ performance in terms of sentencing is
not worse than that of private lawyers. In other words, the results do not support the advantage of either
public defenders or private lawyers.
The case for panel attorneys is different. The results of Table 3.4 show that they plead guilty slightly
less often than private lawyers, but their performance in terms of sentencing is significantly worse than that
of private lawyers. A panel attorney, on average, receives about four months more imprisonment for her
client than a private lawyer.
The disadvantage of defendants with panel attorneys was studied by several scholars. Iyengar (2007)
argues that lack of experience among panel attorneys should be blamed for this low performance. My data
do not contain any information on the characteristics of counsel; therefore, I can not confirm the results of
this study. But my theory predicts that in simple cases, where asymmetric information is not severe, the
More theoretical and empirical studies are needed to confirm this argument.
The results suggest that publicly financed defenders, especially public defenders, behave differently and
achieve different outcomes than private lawyers. Existing theories have been unable to reveal the details of
zeros should be considered with cautions. Moreover, the marginal effects of this model can not be calculated due to technical
problems in calculations. I use a model with only offense types as control variables to create the marginal effects.
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differences, and empirical studies have been inconclusive. One shortcoming of most studies is the fact that
they strive to prove the absolute advantage or disadvantage of one type of defender over the others. The
theory presented in the previous section suggests that it might be a false approach. It is quite possible, as
the theory suggests, that public defenders and private lawyers outperform in different circumstances. The
next section presents evidence in support of this theory.
3.4.3 Analysis of Frequent Offenses
The theory in section (2) suggests that public lawyers and private lawyers have different types of interaction
with prosecutors and their clients. As a result, their behavior varies in different situations. The analysis in
the previous section can not reveal these variations due to the lack of enough information on each case. For
instance, fixed-effects models control only for shift effects of explanatory variables. Moreover, fixed-effects
models use the second-finest categories as control variables -due to low frequency of some of the offenses
using the finest category of offenses is impossible. This choice facilitates the calculation, but fails to capture
the whole effect of offense type. In this section, I conduct the analysis on time, guilty plea, and sentence
length for thirteen groups of more frequent offenses. Each of these groups appears in data more than one
thousand times. These offenses, together, contain about 76 percent of all federal cases in termination stage.
I categorize these groups into four sets of offenses: (1) Bank Rubbery and Firearm, (2) Fraud, (3) Drug, and
(4) Immigration. Tables (5)-(7) present the analysis of processing time, guilty plea, and sentence length,
respectively. These tables also present some characteristics of each group including the percentage of cases
represented by each counsel type, the average sentence, the average processing time, and guilty plea rates.
The “Immigration” set includes three types of offenses: Illegal Entry, Illegal Reentry, and Others. These
are frequent crimes in federal cases. Most defenders in this group, about 60 percent, use the service of public
defenders offices. More than 99 percent of cases terminate by pleading guilty, and the average sentence is
low. These characteristics show that immigration offenses are simple cases. The prosecutor typically does
not have difficulty proving the crime, and, most likely, the defendants are easily convinced to take a plea
deal. In other words, the main problem in federal cases, which is usually asymmetric information between
defender and prosecutor, is not extensive in these immigration cases. As the results in Table 3.5 show, public
defenders terminate these cases faster than private lawyers, and they achieve almost the same outcomes.
The sentence time for their clients are less than or at least equal to those of private lawyers’ clients. They
probably have the advantage of building a mutual understanding with prosecutors, which works in favor
of both parties. Both public defenders and prosecutors know the details of the case, and they effectively
reach or a mutually-beneficial agreement. The punishment for these crimes is more homogeneous than other
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crimes, which appears in small α- the parameter of over-dispersion. The estimated number for α is less than
one in all immigration cases. This result shows that both parties easily agree on the severity of the crime,
the evidence, and the punishment. Based on these results, one can convincingly argue that asymmetric
information does not play a major role in these types of offenses.
Now consider harsh offenses, such as Bank Robbery and Firearm. Although most of the cases are
represented by public lawyers, which shows that defendants are not among high socio-economic groups, they
are different from immigration felonies in terms of expected punishment, guilty plea rates, and processing
time. Moreover, proving the occurrence of this crimes is more complicated than simple immigration crimes.
As a result, the defendants less often agree to plead guilty -about 94 percent for bank robbery and 91
percent for firearms violations. In these complicated cases, public defenders lose their advantages. They can
not significantly shorten the time to be served, if guilty, and at the end, they receive worse outcomes than
their private colleagues. This reflects the disadvantage of public defenders in complicated cases. The high
workload of public defenders, combined with complication of cases, creates this disadvantage. They can not
allocate enough time on these cases, and, as a result, they are unable to defend their clients effectively.
Two other groups of offenses, Fraud and Drug, fall within the two categories of cases considered above.
Fraud offenses are mostly white-collar crimes. Most defendants are able to hire private lawyers. Those
represented by public defenders are able to monitor their agents, and this extends the processing times.
This extension is not in favor of defendants. They receive the same or even higher sentences than the
defenders who hire private lawyers. Moreover, the great over-dispersion, which appears in estimated α of
more than 3, might be the sign of the complexity of these cases. The more complicated a case is, the longer
time it needs to be resolved, and the more diverse are the outcomes. Asymmetric information in these
complicated cases plays a major role.
Drug-related offenses are similar to immigration offenses. Public defenders finish these cases signifi-
cantly faster than their private colleagues, and achieve better outcomes in terms of sentence time. Com-
paring Marijuana-related crimes with Narcotics/Control crimes confirms this finding. The first two types
of drug-related crimes (Marijuana-Sell/distribute and Marijuana-Import) are considered simple crimes with
low processing time, low punishment, and high guilty plea rates. In these offenses, public defenders have
better achievements. The other drug-related crimes (selling and distributing Narcotics and Control Subs)
are severe offenses with high expected punishment. It takes a long time to terminate these cases. Although
public defenders finish these cases faster than private lawyers, they do not achieve better outcomes.
These findings show that the search for absolute advantage of one type of defense counsel may not be
the correct approach to look at the issue of defenders’ performance. A multiple player game of the defense
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process, played between defenders, their clients, and prosecutors create different results in different cases. In
simple cases, public defenders have the advantage in terms of time and sentence length, probably through
building a mutually-beneficial relationship with prosecutors. This enable them to be more successful in
these cases. Complications in criminal cases make it harder for them to achieve better outcome than their
private colleagues. In these cases, the defendants and their clients are able to hide some information from
the prosecutors. A well-trained, experienced, and motivated private lawyer is willing to spend more time
on these cases to achieve better results. A overburden public defender lose her advantage to her private
colleagues.
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3.5 Tables
Table 3.1: Performance by Counsel Type
Performance Private Lawyers Appointed Lawyers Public Defenders
Percentage 24.78% 37.37% 35.40%
Time 235 202 142
GP rates 87.61% 88.70% 92.25%
Conviction Rates at Trial 85.37% 90.46% 83.59%
Mean Sentencing Time 46.75 54.54 39.02
Mean Sentencing Time (GP) 47.95 53.45 39.54
Mean Sentencing Time (Trial) 98.11 144.97 104.05
The difference between the sum of percentages and 100 is due to the “Others” group.
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Counsel Type on Time: All Cases
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
HR: Private 1.36 1.41 1.50
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
HR: Panel 1.65 1.56 1.66
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
HR: Public 2.40 1.87 1.99
(0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
Offense Type NO YES YES
District NO NO YES
More than One Charge NO NO YES
Panel to Private 1.22 1.11 1.11
Test (Chi2, ratio=1) 216.11 57.32 52.29
Public to Private 1.77 1.33 1.31
Test (Chi2, ratio=1) 1848.50 409.65 328.24
Public to Panel 1.45 1.20 1.18
Test (Chi2, ratio=1) 1159.74 249.84 75.79
Number of Observation 162558 162558 162558
HR: Hazard Ratio relative to reference group.
Numbers in () represent robust standard errors.
Table 3.3: The Effect of Counsel Type on Time: Terminated Cases
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Panel (relative to Private) 1.07 1.03 1.04
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Public (relative to Private) 1.50 1.27 1.23
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Offense Type NO YES YES
District NO NO YES
More than One Charge NO NO YES
Test (Chi2, Panel=1) 62.23 6.77 12.65
Test (Chi2, Public=1) 1710.07 484.11 315.01
Number of Observation 75420 75420 75420
Numbers in () represent robust standard errors.
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Table 3.4: The Effect of Counsel Type on Guilty Plea Rates and Imprisonment
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Panel -0.125*** 6.45*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.037***
(0.043) (0.578) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Panel (ME) -0.041*** 6.45*** 4.298*** 4.194*** —
(0.0015) (0.578) (0.418) (0.447) —
Public 0.402*** 0.310 -0.005 -0.020* -0.207***
(0.050) (0.523) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Public (ME) 0.0126*** 0.310 -0.189 -0.734* —
(0.0015) (0.523) (0.417) (0.451) —
GP Rate 94.94%
Alpha 1.568 0.887
(0.012) (0.006)
Number of Observation 71268 71855 71855 71855 71855
Numbers in () represent robust standard errors.
Model (1): Logit regression with all controls.
Model (2): OLS regression with all controls.
Model (3): Poisson regression with all controls.
Model (4): Negative Binomial (NB2) with all controls.
Model (5): Negative Binomial (NB2) zero inflated with multiple charges and offense type as controls.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Counsel Type on Time
Counsel Sentence Time Panel Public NO. Obs.
Bank Robbery 9/37/53 84.3 174 0.972 1.128 1344
(Test: =1) 1.92 1.39
Firearms 20/34/47 59.5 200 0.968 1.149 8833
(Test: =1) 1.08 19.18***
Fraud- Bank 40/33/27 23.1 193 0.931 1.14 1019
(Test: =1) 0.81 2.07
Fraud- Postal, Radio 53/26/21 20.8 239 0.725 0.990 1426
(Test: =1) 23.17*** 0.02
Fraud- False Claims 30/31/39 9.9 160 1.036 1.340 1504
(Test: =1) 0.23 14.17***
Fraud- Conspiracy 44/41/15 14.4 227 1.124 1.270 2166
(Test: =1) 5.01** 11.91***
Marijuana- Sell 31/42/27 36.9 197 1.431 1.793 3519
(Test: =1) 57.05*** 106.73***
Marijuana- Import 13/42/45 18.7 139 1.309 1.460 1537
(Test: =1) 9.64*** 21.50***
Narcotics- Sell 32/50/18 90.9 241 1.021 1.255 7120
(Test: =1) 0.46 26.48***
Controll Subs- Sell 31/52/17 80.2 252 1.019 1.367 10090
(Test: =1) 0.59 72.66***
Immigration- Entry 4/31/65 14.03 69 1.303 1.630 2202
(Test: =1) 5.78** 20.70***
Immigration- Reentry 5/30/65 28.3 83 1.272 1.303 11089
(Test: =1) 24.45*** 43.88***
Immigration- Other 14/48/38 14.5 95 1.245 1.542 4170
(Test: =1) 16.60*** 58.06***
The numbers in “Counsel” indicate the percentage of cases represented by Private/Panel/Public defenders.
Tests are the Chi-Squared statistics for the unity of the hazard ratios presented in Panel and Public column.
Sentence is the average number of months in prison.
Time is the average number of days from proceeding to disposition.
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Counsel Type on Guilty Plea
Panel Public Panel(ME) Public(ME) GP Rate NO. Obs.
Bank Robbery -0.518 0.992* -0.299 0.058* 94.76 1297
(0.498) (0.516) (0.031) (0.033)
Firearms -0.315*** 0.043 -0.21*** 0.003 91.65 8264
(0.118) (0.115) (0.008) (0.007)
Fraud- Bank -0.237 0.902* -0.013 0.041** 95.38 953
(0.383) (0.483) (0.022) (0.019)
Fraud- Postal, Radio -0.750*** 0.164 -0.052** 0.009 91.25 1326
(0.268) (0.359) (0.022) (0.019)
Fraud- False Claims 0.393 1.065*** 0.135 0.035*** 95.58 1403
(0.33) (0.413) (0.109) (0.013)
Fraud- Conspiracy -0.309 -0.014 -0.011 -0.000 96.57 2069
(0.292) (0.451) (0.011) (0.016)
Marijuana- Sell 0.365 0.851** 0.006 0.013*** 97.23 3316
(0.275) (0.334) (0.005) (0.004)
Marijuana- Import 0.666 0.279 0.011 0.005 97.52 1449
(0.509) (0.436) (0.008) (0.007)
Narcotics- Sell -0.628*** 0.090 -0.036*** 0.005 93.02 6706
(0.0121) (0.173) (0.007) (0.009)
Controll Subs- Sell -0.214** 0.321** -0.010** 0.014 94.08 9472
(0.105) (0.154) (0.005) (0.006)
Immigration- Entry 1.241 0.067 0.008 0.001 99.04 2080
(1.253) (1.024) (0.007) (0.008)
Immigration- Reentry 0.299 -0.004 0.003 0.000 99.06 10828
(0.453) (0.432) (0.004) (0.004)
Immigration- Other 0.303 0.819** 0.006 0.014** 98.02 4032
(0.291) (0.331) (0.005) (0.005)
Numbers in () are robust standard errors.
ME (marginal effect): Change in probability of pleading guilty for discrete change in variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Counsel Type on Sentence Length
Panel Public Panel(ME) Public(ME) Alpha NO. Obs.
Bank Robbery 0.215*** 0.280*** 16.96*** 21.32*** 0.593 1325
(0.079) (0.079) (6.421) (5.987) (0.042)
Firearms 0.272*** 0.170*** 15.79*** 9.50*** 1.326 8684
(0.032) (0.030) (1.941) (1.675) (0.030)
Fraud- Bank 0.056 0.044 1.090 0.865 1.583 898
(0.097) (0.102) (1.906) (2.002) (0.093)
Fraud- Postal, Radio -0.095 -0.021 -1.583 -0.359 3.212 1396
(0.097) (0.107) (1.599) (1.800) (0.163)
Fraud- False Claims 0.783*** 0.512*** 4.419*** 2.618*** 3.476 1347
(0.130) (0.122) (0.886) (0.674) (0.187)
Fraud- Conspiracy 0.0159** 0.0121 1.788** 1.401 3.076 2098
(0.064) (0.087) (0.728) (0.051) (0.130)
Marijuana- Sell -0.237*** -0.368*** -7.580*** -11.079*** 1.141 3435
(0.042) (0.047) (1.328) (1.330) (0.040)
Marijuana- Import -0.110 -0.193** -1.881 -3.318** 0.820 1438
(0.095) (0.094) (1.626) (1.619) (0.049)
Narcotics- Sell 0.054** -0.026 4.653** -2.201 1.071 6867
(0.023) (0.028) (2.013) (2.371) (0.029)
Controll Subs- Sell 0.057*** 0.040 4.409*** 3.095 1.235 9857
(0.020) (0.027) (1.578) (2.028) (0.027)
Immigration- Entry 0.369** 0.030 6.089**(1) 2.533(1) 0.588 2013
(0.168) (0.096) (2.522) (1.577) (0.101)
Immigration- Reentry 0.139*** -0.101*** 3.859*** -2.773*** 0.708 10551
(0.041) (0.032) (1.172) (0.893) (0.016)
Immigration- Other 0.102* 0.068 1.206* 0.818 0.978 3690
(0.055) (0.058) (0.654) (0.705) (0.038)
Numbers in () are robust standard errors.
ME (marginal effect): Change in probability of pleading guilty for discrete change in variable from 0 to 1.
(1): Due to non-existence of Positive Definite Matrix, these numbers were calculated in a model without districts as control variables.
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3.6 Figures
Figure 3.1: Survival Functions by Counsel Type
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative Function of Sentence Time by Counsel Type
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 50 100 150 200
Month
private appointed
public
75
Appendix A
Constitutional Protection for Judicial Independence
This appendix provides detail information on the indicators of institutional protection from the con-
stitutions of countries. The source of data on constitutions is The Comparative Constitutions Project by
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2007). I use the data on general characteristics of the judiciary, the supreme
court (highest ordinary court), and ordinary court in section 7. The definitions of variables are as follows:
V01: Whether the courts are anchored in constitution.
The institutional independence of judges, in the first instance, depend on the stability of the rules. The
more stable these rules are, the more powerful and independent the courts will be. V01 is a variable ranging
from zero to one. The index is equal to one if the constitution provides for both the supreme court and
ordinary courts; is zero otherwise.
V02: Explicit declaration of judicial independence.
This index is equal one if the constitution explicitly mentions judicial independence; is zero otherwise.
V031: Are judicial decisions by the highest ordinary court final?
It is equal one if the the decision is final and is equal zero if it can be revised by the political branches.
V032: Additional power of the highest court.
It is equal one if the highest court is granted any of the following powers: supervise elections, impeach-
ment of executive, counter corruption, challenging the constitutionality of political parties, review states of
emergency, and review treaties. It is zero otherwise.
V041: Who is involved in the nomination of the chief justice of the highest ordinary court?
The general rule is that involvement of more than one party provides more independence. The variable is
equal one if more than a section among several political sections of the state (including head of the state,
head of the government, the government/cabinet, first (or only) chamber of the legislature, second chamber
of the legislature, judicial council or commission, or any other political section) are involved in selection
process. It is equal zero otherwise.
V042:The same as V401 for approval process.
76
V043: Whether the parties who are involved in approval process are the same as those who nominate
the chief justice.
If the parties who are involved in the nomination of the chief justice are not the same parties that approve
him/her, we expect the chief justice to have more independence. It is equal to one if the parties are the
same, and is zero otherwise.
V04: Selection process of the chief justice of the highest court.
The average of three components: V041, v042, and v043.
V05: Selection process of justices of the highest court (other than chief justice). Similar to V04.
V06: Selection process of judges of ordinary courts. Similar to V04.
V07: Life tenure of chief justice.
It is equal to one if the chief justice utilize a life tenure and is zero otherwise.
V08: Life tenure of justices of the highest court (other than chief justice) . Similar to V07.
V09: Life tenure of judges of ordinary courts. Similar to V07.
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Appendix B
Changes in Selection Methods
Selection Methods since 1970
State Court Selection Method
Alabama COLR Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
Alaska COLR Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1980) Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Arizona COLR Non-Partisan Election
1974: Merit Plan
IAC Non-Partisan Election
1974: Merit Plan
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
1974: Merit Plan in counties with 150,000 or more people
1992: Merit Plan in counties with 250,000 or more people
Arkansas COLR Partisan Election
2001: Non-Partisan Election
IAC (Established in 1978) Partisan Election
2001: Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
2001: Non-Partisan Election
California COLR Appointed by Governor
IAC Appointed by Governor
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Counties can select GJTC judges through appointment by governor, but as of July 1999 none did.
Colorado COLR Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1970) Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Connecticut COLR Appointed by Legislature
1986: Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1982) Appointed by Legislature
1986: Merit Plan
GJTC Appointed by Legislature
1986: Merit Plan
Before 1986 judges nominated by governor.
Delaware COLR Appointed by Governor
1977: Merit Plan
GJTC Appointed by Governor
1977: Merit Plan
COLR: Court of Last Resort
IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court
GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court
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Selection Methods since 1970 (cont.)
State Court Selection Method
District of Columbia COLR Appointed by the President of the U.S.
1977: Merit Plan
GJTC Appointed by the President of the U.S.
1977: Merit Plan
Judicial Nomination Commission was established by executive order.
Florida COLR Partisan Election
1971: Non-Partisan Election
1976: Merit Plan
IAC Partisan Election
1971: Non-Partisan Election
1976: Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan Election
1971: Non-Partisan Election
Georgia COLR Partisan Election
1983: Non-Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
1983: Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
1983: Non-Partisan Election
Hawaii COLR Appointed by Governor
1978: Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1978) Appointed by Governor
1978: Merit Plan
GJTC Appointed by Governor
1978: Merit Plan
Idaho COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC (Established in 1980) Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Illinois COLR Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
Indiana COLR Partisan Election
1970: Merit Plan
IAC Partisan Election
1970: Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan Election
Some counties use partisan or non-partisan election to select their GJTC judges.
Iowa COLR Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1976) Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Kansas COLR Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1977) Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan Election
1972: Option to use Merit Plan
17 counties use merit plan and 14 of them use partisan election to select their GJTC judges.
Kentucky COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC (Established in 1975) Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
COLR: Court of Last Resort
IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court
GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court
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Selection Methods since 1970 (cont.)
State Court Selection Method
Louisiana COLR Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
There are some factors that lead to somewhat nonpartisan character to elections.
Main COLR Appointed by Governor
GJTC Appointed by Governor
Maryland COLR Merit Plan
IAC Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Judicial Nomination Commission was established by executive order.
Massachusetts COLR Merit Plan
IAC Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Judicial Nomination Commission was established by executive order.
Michigan COLR Partisan Election
IAC Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
There are some factors of nonpartisan character to elections of COLR judges.
Minnesota COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC (Established in 1983) Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Mississippi COLR Partisan Election
1999: Non-Partisan Election
IAC (Established in 1994) Partisan Election
1999: Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
1999: Non-Partisan Election
Some factors of nonpartisan characters were added to partisan election in 1994.
Missouri COLR Merit Plan
IAC Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan (Merit Plan in some)
Some counties use merit plan to select their GJTC judges.
Montana COLR Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Nebraska COLR Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1990) Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Nevada COLR Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
COLR: Court of Last Resort
IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court
GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court
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Selection Methods since 1970 (cont.)
State Court Selection Method
New Hampshire COLR Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Judicial Nomination Commission was established by executive order.
New Jersey COLR Appointed by Governor
IAC Appointed by Governor
GJTC Appointed by Governor
New Mexico COLR Partisan Election
1989: Merit Plan
IAC Partisan Election
1989: Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan Election
1989: Merit Plan
New York COLR Partisan Election
1977: Merit Plan
IAC Partisan Election
1977: Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan Election
North Carolina COLR Partisan Election
2004: Non-Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
2004: Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
1998: Non-Partisan Election
North Dakota COLR Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Ohio COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Elections have some factors of partisan characters.
Oklahoma COLR Merit Plan
IAC Non-Partisan Election
1987: Merit Plan
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Oregon COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Pennsylvania COLR Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
Rhode Island COLR Appointed by Legislature
1994: Merit Plan
GJTC Appointed by Governor
1994: Merit Plan
South Carolina COLR Appointed by Legislature
IAC (Established in 1979) Appointed by Legislature
GJTC Appointed by Legislature
Since 1996, the Legislature is restricted to voting only on candidates qualified by merit commission.
COLR: Court of Last Resort
IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court
GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court
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Selection Methods since 1970 (cont.)
State Court Selection Method
South Dakota COLR Non-Partisan Election
1980: Merit Plan
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Tennessee COLR Partisan Election
1994: Merit Plan
IAC Partisan Election
1971: Merit Plan
GJTC Partisan Election
Texas COLR Partisan Election
IAC Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
Utah COLR Merit Plan
IAC (Established in 1987) Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Vermont COLR Merit Plan
GJTC Merit Plan
Virginia COLR Appointed by Legislature
IAC (Established in 1983) Appointed by Legislature
GJTC Appointed by Legislature
Washington COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
West Virginia COLR Partisan Election
GJTC Partisan Election
Wisconsin COLR Non-Partisan Election
IAC (Established in 1977) Non-Partisan Election
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
Since 1996, there is an advisory council on judicial selection, created by executive order.
Wyoming COLR Non-Partisan Election
1972: Merit Plan
GJTC Non-Partisan Election
1977: Merit Plan
COLR: Court of Last Resort
IAC: Intermediate Appellate Court
GJTC: General Jurisdiction Trial Court
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